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ABSTRACT 
 
Suicide bombings are quickly becoming the tactic of choice for resistance groups around the 
globe, and increasingly, women are becoming the chosen perpetrators. However, the continued 
strength of gender roles and stereotypes has created resistance to these new roles. This project 
argues that narratives surrounding the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) female suicide 
attackers have been politically effective only when they do not depart significantly from 
traditional conceptions of women. Narratives that depict female suicide attackers in traditional 
gender roles are contrasted with those of typically masculine roles. Using narrative theory, two 
case studies are examined: the LTTE’s first and last suspected female suicide attackers, Dhanu 
and Anoja. A deeper understanding of the manipulations of women’s images will potentially 
help us understand the growing trend of female suicide attacks around the world. 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Sri Lanka, female combatants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wear 
battle fatigues, move through jungles with Kalashnikovs strapped to their backs, kill the enemy, 
and are prepared to swallow a cyanide capsule to avoid compromise or capture. They work 
tirelessly and are prepared to kill any who stand in the way of the Tamil cause, an independent 
Tamil nation known as Tamil Eelam. They embody characteristics in utter opposition to those 
reserved for women in conservative Tamil society, and have a reputation for being more 
ferocious than their male counterparts.  
As the Sri Lankan civil war raged on, the LTTE employed more and more women as 
suicide attackers as part of their larger military strategy. The LTTE female suicide attacker is an 
extreme departure from the traditional Tamil role.  As Arjuna Gunawardena bluntly states, 
“Women are traditionally seen as ‘life-givers’ rather than ‘life-takers’: the LTTE has turned them 
into human bombs.”1 The very existence of the female suicide attacker posed a threat to the 
conservative society from which she arose. The tensions created by the use of female violence in 
a conservative society demand a rhetorical explanation. Striving for political popularity in this 
context, the LTTE found creative ways to frame their female suicide attackers. The LTTE is 
“one of the few criminal, terrorist, or guerilla groups to fully exploit every element (or 
stereotype) of womanhood from dutiful daughter to mother to rape victim to ferocious fighter.”2 
Understanding the images that are created and take hold in the larger society has much to tell us 
about the power of particular rhetorical strategies. 
As one scholar noted, “The LTTE’s inclusion of women has also been the focus of global 
attention, moving between an awe-inspired fascination and a deeply disdainful judgment of the 
existence of these female combatants.”3 Between fascination and judgment, narratives have 
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sprung up around the LTTE’s “life-takers” in an attempt to explain these new roles for Tamil 
women and more palatable for conservative society. The narratives created are typically 
depictions of disturbed or vengeful women or of motherhood gone overboard. Both of these 
representations contain justifications for using suicide against an aggressor. 
In this project, I study the LTTE’s first and last known female suicide attackers. The 
LTTE’s first female suicide attacker, Dhanu, successfully assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. 
Her memory has been dominated by claims that she had been raped and was seeking revenge by 
targeting Gandhi. The LTTE’s last known female suicide attacker, Anoja, attempted to kill Sri 
Lankan Army Commander Serath Fonseka in 2006. Her memory has been dominated by a 
debate over her suspected pregnancy. 
I make several arguments in this project. First, I argue that some of these manipulations, 
or narratives, have been more effective than others. By this, I mean that the narrative of the rape 
victim, Dhanu, was an example of effective exploitation by the LTTE because it was reflected in 
the wider society and picked up and disseminated, almost entirely without critical examination. 
The mother warrior narrative surrounding Anoja, on the other hand, remained effective mostly 
within the LTTE community. The backlash to this narrative suggests that it was ineffective in 
garnering support from external audiences. I argue that both of these narratives were intended to 
cater to traditional society, and so include representations of women that close off possible 
avenues for agency and counteract the realities of the women’s violence. 
Second, I argue that the interpretation and remembrance of female suicide attackers is a 
political process that robs them of agency. Confronted with the violence of female suicide 
attackers who break so dramatically with traditional notions, the narratives surrounding them aim 
to resolve these tensions by rationalizing their motivations for violence. The purpose of this 
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project is to shed light on these narratives as a rhetorical means to neutralize the threat that 
female suicide attackers pose to the conservative Tamil society. If women are capable of 
committing extreme acts of violence, then conservative gender roles lose their explanatory 
power. Understanding this rhetorical strategy will add to discussions of the importance of 
narrative to ease our anxieties about material violence as well as for women’s agency. 
Thus, rhetorical analysis is necessary. How people get remembered is just as, if not more, 
important as what they actually were. The narratives we create, in turn, create the women that 
they describe and ought to be examined. While we can’t answer questions about the truth of 
another’s subjectivity, we can try to discover how narratives function. As de Mel says, “Given 
their journey towards becoming a regular, if not still spectacular, form of violence that attracts 
immediate global media coverage, there is much at stake in controlling how the suicide bomber 
is represented and apprehended.”4  
In Chapter One, I will provide an overview of the conflict that ravaged Sri Lanka for 
decades, the rise and fall of the LTTE, and the appearance of the LTTE’s suicide attacker. 
Additionally, I will review the existing literature and the topic and describe my theoretical 
approach. 
Chapter Two is a study of a related but distinct narrative about sexual violence and 
female suicide attackers. I examine the narrative constructed about Dhanu, the female suicide 
attacker who assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. The narrative that arose around Dhanu is 
dominated by claims that she had been raped by Indian Peace Keeping Forces. Discussions of 
female suicide attackers as vengeful victims of sexual violence is another attempt to “justify” 
their violence outside of the political realm. In both cases my analysis suggests that these two 
narratives strip female suicide attackers of political agency. 
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Chapter Three is a study of the motherhood narrative as it relates to female suicide 
attackers. In this chapter, I discuss the interactions between narratives about motherhood in 
Tamil culture and female suicide attackers. The LTTE exploits narratives about motherhood to 
optimize success of the suicide missions as well as justify women’s violence to the larger 
conservative society. Through their manipulations of narratives about women, the LTTE 
effectively controls how the world remembers those women. 
Finally, I conclude by explaining the importance of how we remember these particular 
women and how my study contributes to the field. My study will reinforce what we know about 
the power of narrative as well as the interactions between narrative and agency. 
                                                 
1 Arjuna Gunawardena, “Female Black Tigers: A Different Breed of Cat?,” in Female Suicide 
Bombers: Dying for Equality?, ed. Yoram Schweitzer (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic 
Studies, 2006): 87. 
2 Alisa Stack-O’Connor, “Lions, Tigers, and Freedom Birds: How and Why the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam Employs Women,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007): 44. 
3 Tahira Gonsalves, “Media Manipulations and Agency: Women in the LTTE (Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam) of Sri Lanka,” The Ahfad Journal 22, no. 2 (December 2005), 36. 
4 Neloufer de Mel, Militarizing Sri Lanka: Popular Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed 
Conflict (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007), 197. 
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THE LTTE’S FEMALE SUICIDE ATTACKERS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is marked by the use of 
strategic suicides. In 1974, an LTTE member swallowed a cyanide capsule during a failed bank 
robbery to avoid arrest.1 In 1987, seventeen LTTE commanders were arrested by the Sri Lankan 
army. All took cyanide capsules in prison; twelve died. This mass suicide incited a three-year-
long war between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Forces. Soon, each LTTE member 
was required to wear a glass cyanide capsule around their neck to bite down on if they were 
captured or compromised. Rather than potentially become a prisoner or a source of information 
for the enemy, all members of the LTTE were prepared to end their lives.2 At least 600 LTTE 
members have died from biting down on their cyanide capsules.3  
Suicide, even in the military context, took on an almost spiritual importance for LTTE 
members. Prabhakaran, the LTTE’s founder and leader, described it this way: 
It is this cyanide that has helped us develop our movement very rapidly. Carrying cyanide 
on our person is a symbolic expression of our determination, our commitment, our 
courage. It gives our fighters an extra measure of belief in our cause, a special edge; the 
cyanide has instilled in us a determination to sacrifice our lives and our everything for 
our cause.4 
The use of cyanide was a practical policy to avoid compromising the secrets of the group as well 
as a symbolic commitment to the common nationalist cause. Suicide became heroic. It was “a 
well-known and legitimate response to suffering,”5 not a desperate act.  
In 1987, the “special edge” of the LTTE was transformed into concrete military 
advantage. An LTTE member drove a truck filled with explosives into a Sri Lankan military 
camp. This surprise attack was followed by a larger military offensive that successfully defeated 
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a Sri Lankan Army operation.6 Unlike the personal, defensive suicides that protested suffering at 
the hands of the Sri Lankan state, suicide was transformed into an aggressive military tactic. 
They have carried out more suicide attacks than every other group in the world combined, and 
more suicide attacks with women perpetrators than every other group. 
This study focuses specifically on female suicide attackers in the LTTE. I show that in 
conservative Sri Lankan society, the narratives surrounding these women counteract the realities 
of the violence that they perpetrate. Narratives of female suicide attackers are overwhelmingly 
concerned with gender and aimed at neutralizing the link between women and violence.  
There has been very little work about female suicide attackers from a rhetorical 
perspective. Yet, this work is important for two main reasons. First, political scientists have 
unquestionably dominated the conversation. Studies on this topic have asked and attempted to 
answer impossible questions, centering on the “truth” of female suicide attackers’ subjectivity. 
Research that focuses on these questions is unmistakably misdirected, especially in this context. 
Suicide missions and the identities of suicide attackers are very secretive—making judgments 
about them would be an impossible task. Any conclusions drawn about their experiences are 
necessarily conjecture.  
In the case of LTTE female suicide attackers, narratives are created that rationalize and 
depoliticize their violent actions. Faced with the disturbing juxtaposition between the peaceful 
woman stereotype and female suicide attackers who commit extreme acts of violence, people 
seek explanation. Media in the U.S., Sri Lanka, and around the globe contemplate and debate the 
motivations of the female suicide attacker, as do we in academia. The narrative created is 
overwhelmingly one of disturbed or vengeful women or of motherhood gone overboard. In this 
study, I argue that we have much to learn from these narratives. For, as I shall make clear, the 
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interpretation and remembrance of female suicide attackers is a patently political process. Such 
remembrance serves a wide range of political purposes and has drastic implications for women’s 
identities and agencies. Even though this study is focused on the LTTE’s female suicide 
attackers, these images have ramifications for all women. Morrissey, undertaking a similar but 
distinct study about women murderers, says this about the importance of understanding the 
approach to women’s violence: 
It is important to recognize that representations of all female killers have an impact on 
understandings of what being a woman means, and that, therefore, all such portrayals are 
important for study.7 
Second, and related to the above concept, female suicide attackers get disproportionate 
media coverage. It signals to us, at least, the discomfort and allure of female suicide attackers 
demands explanation. The combination of limited knowledge and excessive media coverage 
about them inspires extreme and distorted understandings. Reid explains this phenomenon aptly: 
The fact remains that women who kill, or threaten to kill, or at the very least fight for 
what they believe in, are hot news. It is a reaction that knows no state or religious 
boundaries. Women soldiers in any army are a thing of horror and fascination, both 
feared and jeered. Female murderers are reviled. Terrorists glamorised. Anywhere in the 
world, a woman who takes life with violence is a thrilling curiosity (and one who steps 
into the male territory of aggressive suicide especially so).8 
My interest here is not in proving the strength of gender stereotypes, which is apparent, or 
reifying them by displaying a chauvinist fascination with female suicide attackers. Instead, I 
highlight some trends in the nature of the attention, and explain the implications of how they are 
talked about. The characteristics of the narrative surrounding female suicide attackers are 
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important, and as de Mel says, “Given their journey towards becoming a regular, if not still 
spectacular, form of violence that attracts immediate global media coverage, there is much at 
stake in controlling how the suicide bomber is represented and apprehended.” 9 This discussion 
has much to tell us about the increasing trend of female suicide attackers and societal reactions. 
As a background to the coming chapters, I discuss the context that gave rise to Sri 
Lanka’s female suicide attackers and the method of the project. 
 
EMERGENCE OF THE LTTE SUICIDE ATTACKER 
The emergence and fall of the LTTE has complex historical roots. The LTTE is a 
separatist group fighting for a separate ethnic Tamil homeland on the island of Sri Lanka. They 
had been in battle with the Sri Lankan government for over 25 years until their charismatic 
leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, was killed in the spring of 2009. His death, along with most of 
the LTTE leadership, has undeniably damaged the group’s separatist goals. It is impossible to 
know the fate of the LTTE or of Sri Lanka, but an examination of their past can help us 
understand the historical circumstances that pushed them into a bloody civil war. 
Sri Lanka’s civil war was primarily an ethnic conflict. Today there are several ethnic 
groups residing in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese are the numeric majority.10 They are 
overwhelmingly Buddhist and speak Sinhalese.11 The next largest ethnic group is the Tamils, 
who are majority Hindu and speak Tamil.12 The Sinahalese are typically represented by the Sri 
Lankan government, and the LTTE arose to represent Tamil interests. The next largest ethnic 
groups are the Moors, who are of Arabic origin and typically speak Tamil, and the Malays, who 
were brought by the Dutch during colonial rule.13 There are also Burghers, who are those with 
Portuguese and Dutch ancestry who are typically Christian and speak English.14 Other ethnic 
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groups include the Chetties, Borahs, and Parsees.15 Despite this diversity, and the fact that the 
effects of the civil war are undeniably shared by all Sri Lankans, it was mainly a war between 
Sinhalese and Tamil.  Thus, I will focus on those two groups.   
For much of Sri Lankan history, Sinhalese and Tamil peoples co-existed peacefully. As 
Nissan and Stirrat argue, “For long periods of time groups which would now be characterized in 
terms of the Sinhala-Tamil divide lived more or less at peace with one another…Sinhala-Tamil 
communal violence dates from after Independence.”16 Before colonialism, ethnic harmony was 
the norm. Sri Lankans were aware of distinct ethnicities and groups, but mixed marriage was 
common, and so were conversions between different language and religions.17 
The colonial period disrupted this harmony. Sri Lanka (or Ceylon until 1972) was under 
colonial rule from the 1500s until its independence in 1948.18 The Portuguese controlled coastal 
areas from 1506 to 1658, the Dutch from 1658 to 1796, and Britain controlled coastal areas and 
then the entire island from 1796 to 1948.19 At first, ethnicity remained a relatively unimportant 
signifier. The Portuguese and Dutch were more interested in spice supplies and sea trading routes 
than with interfering too much with Sri Lankan lives or culture.20 As Sabaratnam states, “Ethnic 
difference was indeed recognized; ethnic groups were categorized by both the colonized and the 
colonizer, but ethnicity did not figure significantly in the colonial political economy.”21 When 
ethnic difference was emphasized, it was more on the differences between the colonizers and 
their colonized population.22  
This changed in 1796 when the Dutch signed over control to the British.23 With the 
British came the influence of the industrial revolution with emphasis on labor, trade, politics, and 
more importantly, identity formation.24 The British, unlike the Portuguese and the Dutch, took 
power over not only territory but also ethnic labels. The colonizers considered linguistic and 
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religious differences to be signs of racial difference and categorized the Sri Lankan populace into 
several different “races.”25 They used their racial categories as the basis for representation when 
they began allowing Sri Lankans government positions.26 In this communal system, the British 
believed that the biggest threat to their rule was the ethnic majority, the Sinhalese Buddhists. As 
a result, the British favored the Tamils in government and education to minimize risks to their 
power.27 
Sri Lankan gained its independence in 1948.28 The British relinquished power peacefully 
in part because of the relatively good relations between the ethnic groups.29 Unfortunately, 
leftover representation policies from British rule caused Sinhalese and Tamil political leaders to 
spar about unfair access to public service.30 Low-level political sparring turned into all-out 
fighting in 1956. Sinhala become the official language of Sri Lanka with the passage of the 
Official Language Act of 1956.31 Also known as the Sinhala-Only Act, it had widespread 
ramifications for those who spoke only Tamil. Tamils who didn’t speak Sinhala were fired from 
their jobs, and it became more difficult for Tamils to gain access to public service.32 
Additionally, a process of “standardization” instituted a new system for university admissions 
that required Tamils to meet higher standards than their Sinhalese counterparts for university 
admission.33 The combination of being barred from public service and university education 
created new Tamil alliances and eventually the impetus for a separate Tamil state, Eelam 
(meaning freedom).34  
These divisions were the catalyst for the long-running Sri Lankan civil war.35 Sinhala-
Tamil violence took place sporadically over the next decades, mostly in the form of riots. In 
1956, shortly after the Sinhala-Only Act passed, Tamils displayed opposition by painting out 
Sinhala characters on license plates, and Sinhalese retaliated by painting over Tamil-language 
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signs.36 Rioting, spawned by an attack on a train filled with Tamil passengers, escalated and four 
hundred people were killed and 12,000 ended up homeless. The victims were overwhelmingly 
Tamil.37 Spurts of violence like this continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
 The LTTE rose to prominence in this violent environment. Several groups were formed, 
but the LTTE’s strategic dominance and dedication brought them to the head of the pack.38 The 
LTTE began operations in northern Sri Lanka on government officials, military, property, and 
even Tamils that they believed sympathized with Sinhalese.39 The reaction to Tamil violence 
escalated again into riots in 1977, when over one hundred people were killed.40 The Sri Lankan 
government responded with the Prevention of Terrorism Act, passed in 1979, which gave Sri 
Lankan military and police officials the power to arrest and detain people for up to eighteen 
months without trial. Military and police used this power to intimidate Tamil populations, and 
naturally it intensified the enmity between the two ethnic groups.41 The violence continued in 
June 1981 with another episode of riots. Sinhalese police were stationed to keep watch over local 
elections, and ended up killing Tamil civilians and burning down the Tamil cultural center, the 
Jaffna Municipal Library.42 
The conflict reached a tipping point in 1983. Riots broke out, and were the most intense 
up to that point in Sri Lankan history.43 On July 23, the LTTE killed thirteen Sinhalese soldiers. 
The LTTE maintained that the killings were in retaliation of the Sri Lankan Army’s killing of 
two LTTE soldiers and rape of a Tamil girl.44 When the soldiers’ bodies were transported to 
Colombo, the violence escalated.45 Sinhalese rioters, aided in many ways by the Sri Lankan 
Army, beat, killed, and raped Tamil civilians. In the end, attacks on Tamil business, property, 
and Tamil people46 caused four hundred to two thousand Tamil murders and thousands of 
refugees.47 Tamils fled to the north and east part of the country,48 which incidentally is now the 
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area the LTTE claims as their own. Lack of action to stop the riots by the government, and 
blatant government perpetration of some of the violence, radicalized the Tamil population.49 In 
fact, the riots were a boon for recruitment for Tamil resistance groups among youth.50 Before the 
1983 riots, Tamil resistance groups typically had around fifty members; afterwards, hundreds of 
Tamils clamored to join the resistance.51 1983 is often identified as the defining year in 
Sinhalese-Tamil relations. The 1983 riots are widely recognized as the beginning of Sri Lanka’s 
civil war. 
Attempts at a ceasefire and peace talks failed in 1985 and again in 1986.52 During this 
time, the LTTE was receiving monetary support, training, and supplies from the Indian 
government, who decided to sponsor the group in hopes of increasing stability in the region.53 
Ironically, the Indian Peace Keeping Forces became embroiled in the conflict to enforce a 
ceasefire in 1987, and the LTTE turned against them. 1,157 Indian troops were killed by LTTE 
attackers and India withdrew three years later.54 Seen as an act of retaliation for occupation of 
the Indian Peacekeepers, the LTTE assassinated the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in May 
1991.55 The female suicide attacker who carried out the attack is the subject of Chapter Two. 
The 1990s was characterized as a similar period of broken ceasefires and multiple 
assassination attempts on Sri Lankan leadership. In 2002, Norway brokered a ceasefire between 
the government and the LTTE. It didn’t last. A suicide attack in 2004 killed four police officers, 
and a 2006 bombing of a bus killed 63—and prompted the Sri Lankan government to retaliate 
with air strikes in Tamil areas.56 2006 peace talks in Geneva failed, and the conflict continued to 
escalate.57 That year, a female suicide attacker, Anoja, attempted to assassinate Sri Lankan 
general Fonseka at a military hospital.58 Anoja inspires the content of Chapter Three. 
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Sri Lankan government finally pulled out of the 2002 ceasefire agreement in 2008.59 In 
the spring of 2009, war-weary and sensing defeat, the LTTE declared a ceasefire. Believing the 
pledge of nonviolence to be deceitful, the Sri Lankan military continued operations and killed 
Prabhakaran, the LTTE’s leader. This functionally meant the end of the violent civil war that had 
lasted over a quarter of a century.60 Almost every Sri Lankan has been affected by the conflict 
either as victims, relatives of victims, LTTE members, Sri Lankan army members, refugees, 
etc.61 In 2008, it was estimated that over 65,000 people have died as a result of the conflict. 
There are also an estimated 700,000 IDPs and the refugees number in the millions.62 
As is clear, tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils had been building for decades. Ethnic 
divisions made salient by British colonization have resulted in the devastation of Sri Lanka, lives 
lost, and constant warfare. This is the environment that gave rise to the civil war and to the group 
that deploys the most successful and destructive suicide attacks in the world. Moreover, it is 
difficult to argue that this conflict is “over” for the Sri Lankans, even with the recent cease fire.  
The resistance has been so extreme and so long-lasting that its total disappearance from Sri 
Lanka seems unlikely. Long-set enmities don’t simply disappear, and despite Prabhakaran’s 
death, the resistance is likely to come back. The spring 2009 round of fighting may very well be 
the latest set of events, not the last.63 
 
SUICIDE ATTACKS AND THE LTTE 
 Out of this brutal civil war arose the deadly LTTE suicide attack. The LTTE’s 
deployment of the suicide attack is unique for three reasons: their leadership, their strategic use, 
and its secular nature. As mentioned earlier, the LTTE is widely considered the world leader in 
this method.64 Additionally, they are the only group to have successfully killed two world 
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leaders, Indian Prime Ministerial candidate Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe 
Premadasa.65 One scholar notes, they’ve killed “one president, one presidential candidate, the 
State Minister of Defence, the Navy Chief and various area commanders. No country has lost so 
many leaders in such a short period of time as Sri Lanka has to the LTTE suicide bombers.” 66 In 
this process, they have lost approximately 241 of their suicide attackers, known as Black 
Tigers.67 
 The LTTE is also unlike many other groups because they are focused primarily on 
military effectiveness, not religious martyrdom or terrorizing populations. There is much 
evidence for this. Except for the attack on Gandhi, the LTTE has stayed within Sri Lanka and 
targeted political and military targets, not civilians.68 The LTTE uses suicide as an attack method 
precisely because it can achieve the most targeted results.69 As Hopgood states, “For the LTTE, 
the Black Tigers have not been a weapon of last resort but an integral part of, even an 
intensification of, a strategy of insurgency.”70  
The LTTE’s suicide attackers also carried out their missions with the knowledge that 
military victory was an attainable goal.71 First, unlike many other groups, the LTTE has 
employed suicide attacks not as a desperate tact against a much larger and advanced army—until 
the recent ceasefire, the LTTE had basically kept toe-to-toe with the Sri Lankan army and 
functioned much as a working army themselves—but as a military method to access difficult-to-
reach targets.72 Second, suicide attacks are typically more successful than military coercion. In 
fact, the success rate for conventional military means is a meager 30%. For suicide attacks, that 
rises to about 50%—a great statistic by any measure. 73 The LTTE has certainly had concrete 
successes using this method. One example for this is the IPKF’s stint in Sri Lanka from 1987-
1990. Their coercive method failed to defeat the LTTE or compel them to surrender; violence 
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merely strengthened their hand. Using suicide attacks during guerilla warfare, the LTTE got the 
Indian Peace Keeping Forces to withdraw from the country in March 1990.74 They also got the 
Sri Lankan government twice to agree to negotiations using the suicide attack.75 One notable 
exception to the LTTE’s success was their attempted assassination of President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga, who survived, but lost an eye.76  
Suicide attacks are more destructive, more flexible, and more likely to destroy their 
targets than conventional military means. And most of all, they work psychologically, as the 
signal of more and escalating violence to come.77 Joshi states, “In carrying out these desperate 
acts, the suicide bombers are more than just a particularly effective weapon in the Tigers’ 
arsenal. They become a powerful symbol of control—the ultimate weapon with which to hold 
society to ransom.”78 
 Unlike many sensational media reports about other violent groups, the LTTE’s suicide 
attacks are largely secular. Despite the religious element to the ethnic conflict, it is not 
considered to play a large factor in this case. As explained above, the main purpose of the suicide 
attack is military effectiveness, not death for death’s sake.79 The LTTE tries to avoid the death of 
the attacker if the military goal can still be achieved. 80 In fact, their first suicide attack in 1987 
may have been accidental. There is no evidence that the attacker had intended to die, and may 
instead have made a last minute choice to sacrifice his life for the success of the mission.81 As 
Perez states, “The LTTE does not recruit suicide bombers as religious or ideological martyrs. 
Their goal is not a sacrifice or political statement, but an attack on a target. If the attack can be 
achieved more efficiently and effectively through conventional means, suicide missions are not 
employed.”82 Black Tigers are “disciplined, skilled and battle-tested,” not suicidal.83 In fact, the 
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LTTE screens and then trains its Black Tigers for months, making unnecessary deaths a waste of 
time and resources. Hopgood points out,   
Black Tigers embody the sacrifices required to win Tamil liberation, and thus they play a 
prominent role in boosting Tamil resolve and morale. It is important, therefore, that they 
are a disciplined and impressive military unit. They are an inspiration for Tamils. This 
too, is a reason for emphasis on high-quality training, personal discipline, and 
preparation: if they are to be a source of pride, they must be soldiers one can be proud 
of.84 
There is some contention about the role of religion concerning suicide missions, but most 
evidence points to them as a secular, military phenomenon.85  
 Though not explicitly religious, there is undeniably a religious-like admiration for the 
Black Tigers in the Tamil community: “[f]rom the time a cadre is singled out to be a Black 
Tiger, he or she acquires a mythical admiration.”86 Overwhelmingly Hindu, the LTTE’s suicide 
attackers don’t look forward to an afterlife, but to the way that they’ll be remembered. 
Ceremonies are held, candles are lit and garlands are draped on their graves, and the LTTE often 
supports the attackers’ families financially.87 Every year, the LTTE celebrates Black Tigers Day 
on the anniversary of their first suicide attack.88 The reverence for LTTE suicide attackers is so 
great that one scholar noted, “Young Tamils know the names of the martyrs the way young 
American kids know the names of sports stars.” 89 This holds for female suicide attackers as well. 
As one scholar colloquially stated,  
Death, not life, is celebrated. The greatest feat for a woman is to die a martyr. This 
celebration of heroic death is an aspect of most nationalist movements, but in the LTTE it 
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is a major factor which determines and conditions the life of women who have dedicated 
themselves to the cause.90 
 
FEMALE BLACK TIGERS 
Women in the group did not always enjoy this special status. At first, the LTTE turned to 
women combatants through necessity. Sri Lanka’s civil war, which began in 1983, was having 
severe ramifications for the Tamil separatists. With more and more combatants falling in battle 
and emigration from Sri Lanka depleting the pool of potential recruits, the LTTE was hurting for 
cadres. Eventually the LTTE opened itself up to women’s participation in combat roles. In 1985 
women starting combat training alongside men and participating in combat.91 Several estimates 
had women composing about one-third of the organization.92  
No longer could Tamil women support the nation symbolically—they had to participate 
personally. Instead of sending their husbands and sons into combat, more and more women were 
donning battle fatigues and carrying Kalashnikovs. Further, more and more women were 
donning suicide belts and sacrificing their lives for Tamil Eelam.93 Women’s increased 
participation was reflected throughout the group, especially in its suicide unit, the Black Tigers. 
In fact, while women composed about one-third of the group overall, they accounted for about 
two-thirds of the Black Tigers. 
Female suicide attackers are more attractive than their male counterparts for several 
reasons. First, missions involving women are more likely to succeed. Women are not seen as the 
“typical” aggressor, and so are less likely to be suspected or searched. 94  In fact, women can 
conspicuously carry explosives around their torsos to feign pregnancy, putting them even further 
above suspicion: “a woman’s ability to get pregnant and the attendant changes to her body 
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facilitate concealment of weapons and bombs using maternity clothing, as well as further 
impeding inspection because of impropriety issues.”95 In fact, the LTTE invented the suicide belt 
to specifically fit the shape of the female body.96 Second, missions carried out by female suicide 
attackers have the greatest psychological impact on a society. The radical departure from what is 
traditionally expected of women means that women are “garnering even more notice from the 
media and further publicizing the demands of the LTTE.”97 Female suicide attackers can carry 
the separatist message of the LTTE stronger and further than their male counterparts: 
The use of women as suicide bombers has proven to be even more effective than that of 
male suicide bombers because the practice contrasts so sharply with most gender 
stereotypes. Female terrorists attract more media attention, and perhaps inspire more fear, 
because they are unexpected and contrary to traditional female gender roles.98 
This was not lost on Prabhakaran: it is claimed that the LTTE’s leader would hand-pick recruits, 
and would pick three women for every two men.99 
I have chosen to talk about the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s female suicide 
attackers for three reasons: the high prevalence of female suicide attackers in the group, 
discussed above, the nature of the conflict that produced them, and their role as a model for other 
violent groups. The LTTE emerged from a conflict situation that may repeat itself in many other 
areas of the world. As Kaldor explains in New and Old Wars, globalization has inspired a new 
type of conflict. States are losing their monopolies on violence and para-military groups are 
becoming more common. These “new wars” are fought over identity, not ideology, and are less 
state-based. As new wars become identity-based, resolution becomes even more out of reach. If a 
conflict can only be solved by neutralizing the importance of ethnicity, recent history has taught 
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us that the outlook is grim, at least in the short term. Negotiation is stymied by what are 
perceived to be static identities.100  
Third, groups around the world model the LTTE and its practices. LTTE cadres were 
present for the first modern suicide attack during their training with Hezbelloh in the 1980s. 
They witnessed Hezbollah’s attack on U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983.101 The LTTE adopted the 
method, and perfected it. As one scholar noted, “They professionalized, and institutionalized, 
suicide bombing.”102 Now groups in the Middle East and around the world study and emulate the 
LTTE’s methods. Given that the LTTE is responsible for more than half of the world’s suicide 
attacks, they have many examples. Just as the LTTE copied Hezbollah, modern groups now copy 
the LTTE. It is believed that Al Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole in 2000 was a copy of an LTTE 
attack on a Sri Lankan naval ship in 1991.103 As one scholar stated, “no one studies the LTTE, 
except other terrorist groups.” 104 Even if the LTTE never reemerges with the same power it once 
had, other groups may borrow their effective suicide tactics, and perhaps their useful narratives 
about their female suicide attackers. This can already be seen, at least, in the media coverage of 
Russian female suicide attackers, the Black Widows. After their most recent spate of attacks this 
March, explicit comparisons with the LTTE were being made.105 
 
THE EXPERIENCE OF LTTE WOMEN 
Rhetoric seems the most appropriate course to examine these narratives. Most work 
concerned with LTTE women takes a political science perspective, and is dominated by 
questions of empowerment. As mentioned earlier, this angle is probably misguided, but many 
scholars have been pulled in this direction. There are basically three trends in the literature: those 
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who argue that women’s participation in the LTTE is empowering, those who disagree, and those 
who take issue with this question in the first place. 
Peter Schalk and a short list of other scholars are rather lonely in their defense of the 
LTTE experience as an empowering one. Schalk argues that the LTTE has its own unique brand 
of feminism, which he calls “martial feminism.” This type of feminism recognizes that issues of 
peace and war concern both genders; thus, women’s participation in the group proves their 
equality to men.106 
Again, not surprisingly, this is not a popular viewpoint. The list of scholars who oppose 
women’s participation on the grounds that it is an exercise in oppression is much longer: 
Coomaraswamy, Stack-O’Connor, Jayamaha, Chenoy, Ramachandran, Jordan and Denov, 
Davis, and many more. Most in this camp agree that participation in the LTTE can have some 
positive aspects for women, but those are always temporary and even more, restricted by the 
LTTE’s nationalistic goals. Women in the group are largely pawns that are subject to strict 
sexual control, confined to using violence as an emancipatory tool, overly militarized, and have 
no decision-making powers. These scholars also tend to agree that any positive factors are only 
temporary. Once the women leave the group they must retreat back into the conservative Sri 
Lankan society, which has not much changed, gender-wise, as a result of women’s participation 
in the LTTE. Overall, they believe that the mere presence of women doesn’t guarantee the group 
a feminist outlook.107 Coomaraswamy is a particularly biting critic, calling LTTE women “cogs 
in the wheel” of a nationalist project that has nothing to offer them. Moreover, she argues, 
women have more to lose with the loss of traditional Tamil values than they gain with militaristic 
service. 108  
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 The list of those who oppose women’s participation in the LTTE grows when we 
consider women’s role as suicide attackers. De Mel, Reid, Gunawardena, Skaine, Schweitzer, 
Beyler, Bloom, and more imagine female suicide attackers are the epitome of patriarchal 
expression. While some, like de Mel, argue that there could be potential for real empowerment, 
this may be overshadowed by the loss of control over sexuality and individuality. Women are 
operating in the public sphere in ways that they previously never could, but their avenues for 
expression (i.e., death) could merely be fulfilling patriarchal ideals like female sacrifice.109  
These scholars argue that female suicide attackers are not empowered, they are merely 
disposable. They are effectively used as human bullets against the enemy, “cannon fodder on the 
battlefield.” 110 For these scholars, this is an example of extreme exploitation that sacrifices 
women for a nationalist goal that they have no voice in. More evidence for their claims is the fact 
that female suicide attackers often come from traditional or conservative societies.111 
Coomaraswamy says female suicide attackers offer no hope of empowerment, and bluntly states, 
“the complete annihilation and mutilation of the female body in pursuit of a political cause, 
is…unusual and disturbing.”112 Mia Bloom echoes this sentiment when she says, “In a sense, 
martyrdom is the ultimate and twisted fulfillment of these [patriarchal] ideals…The message 
female suicide bombers send is that they are more valuable to their societies dead than they ever 
could have been alive.”113  
 The third trend in the literature is the scholars who believe that questions of 
empowerment are unanswerable. Alison and Rajasingham-Senanayake both believe that it isn’t 
productive to investigate empowerment, because relationships to conflict are simply too 
complex. No two women can have the same experiences, and other identity markers muddy the 
ground even further. Both wish to avoid doubly victimizing women by risking claims about 
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material conditions that may be inaccurate or denying them agency only because of disagreement 
with their methods.114 Instead, both defend the idea of “ambivalent empowerment” and Alison 
even states, “the debate over whether LTTE women are agents or victims, liberated or 
subjugated, emancipated or oppressed strikes me as an unnecessary and unsophisticated 
binary.”115 
 I agree. Questions about women’s empowerment based on material conditions in the 
LTTE or Sri Lanka simply can’t be answered with any accuracy. All women come from different 
classes, ethnicities, and have different relationships to their own gender experiences. Adding to 
the complexity is the multitude of ways that women can relate to conflict. More bluntly, our lack 
of knowledge of women’s experiences before they become suicide attackers is shallow, and their 
deaths close them to us even further. My project is concerned with representations of, rather than 
the “truth” of, female suicide attacker’s experiences. 
 
THE FEMALE SUICIDE ATTACKER AND NARRATIVE 
Examining these narratives seems worthwhile. Most broadly, narrative is how people 
come to understand the world. Narrative is used to create coherency out of seemingly random 
and unconnected events. The importance of narrative in understanding has been highlighted by 
several scholars, most notably Walt Fisher, Hayden White and Paul Ricoeur. Fisher argues that 
humans are essentially story telling animals and that narratives make arguments and judgments 
about our world.116 While Fisher has been criticized for over-emphasizing the importance of 
narrative, his basic premise that narrative makes arguments about society suggests the 
importance of their study.117  
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Hayden White adds to this conversation the universality of narrative. He tells us that 
narrative is a method that all cultures use to make sense of their surroundings. Narratives are 
necessary to create meanings, particularly for historic events. They give random events 
coherency.118 As he says, “We may not be able fully to comprehend specific thought patterns of 
another culture, but we have relatively less difficulty understanding a story coming from another 
culture.” 119 We also know from White that no historical account can be “true” or “accurate.” All 
events considered history are bound up in the time that they are told. 
Paul Ricoeur echoes White’s emphasis on narrative, and his conceptions of history are 
additionally useful. He argues that narratives are used to make history easily understandable and 
acceptable: “events are properly transformed into history” through narrative.120 Ricoeur reminds 
us that it is impossible to study history objectively, because any “true” characters or events have 
been altered to make them agreeable (or disagreeable, depending on the context).121  
 Narrative has a defining role in Sri Lanka’s civil war. There are dominant narratives on 
both sides about history, ethnicity, and the nation. Within these emerge sub-narratives about 
gender and the nation that produce female characters. Female suicide attackers are an evolving 
part of the Tamil history that are approached via narrative. As Maunaguru explains,  
Gender emerges, than, as a central category in the history of latter day Tamil nationalism, 
in both its peaceful and militant moments. It is not that ‘women’ must also be included as 
an ‘add on’ in this narrative; it is rather that relations of gender and power, central as they 
are in any historical narrative, produce the position of ‘women’ in their operation.122 
Nationalism is unquestionably the core of the Tamil project, and women are central to their 
particular brand of nationalism. Without an examination of the role of women, we cannot fully 
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understand the role of other narratives in the conflict. This project seems an appropriate starting 
point. 
 As may be evident, this study requires the inclusion of a multitude of texts. Narratives 
about female suicide attackers are found in many places. They appear in Sri Lankan media, 
LTTE documents, US and global media sources, blogs, investigative reports, and even a US 
women’s fashion magazine. I will analyze the representations of the LTTE suicide attacker in 
these media. Many of these representations, chronologically, began with the LTTE and have 
made their way into wider media. Whether the narratives that the LTTE created have been 
picked up by other outlets, or all of these sources have independently come to create the same 
images and characters, the power of the narrative is evident. 
I approach these representations as a rhetorical analyst with political aims. I examine the 
narratives surrounding these particular women because I find them troubling from a feminist 
point of view. This concern is shared by other feminists as well. As de Mel notes,  
[A] feminist representation of the women combatant/suicide bomber would also ask that 
she be assessed according to her political choices; to make visible her agentive and 
resourceful moments; to understand the terms on which she negotiates with patriarchy; to 
see her actions as strategies of coping and (symbolic) survival.123 
While I skirt explicit questions of women’s agency, there is clear overlap which will be 
discussed later. 
As with any study, there are limitations. First, as referenced earlier, the LTTE is a 
secretive organization. Many potentially revealing texts are simply unavailable because of the 
organization’s policies. Second and most problematically, I am a Western, white, English-
speaker. I do not have access to texts printed in Tamil or Sinhala because of language barriers as 
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well as availability problems. I also do not, and cannot, have the same vantage point as those 
native to the culture. This study had to be undertaken with the utmost care to avoid the tempting, 
yet colonizing, judgments that one can make about another culture.124 Despite these drawbacks, 
this is an important and worthwhile study. These are narratives that are lasting and have impact. 
In the coming chapter, I analyze the case of Dhanu, the LTTE’s first female suicide attacker. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 21, 1991, a crowd of supporters rushed to meet Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi at one of his campaign stops in India.  One member of the crowd, a young woman named 
Dhanu, emerged at the front, wearing thick glasses and a long dress, bulging at the waist. Dhanu 
approached Gandhi, placed a sandalwood garland around his neck, and knelt as a sign of respect.  
As Gandhi bent to raise her up, she activated her suicide belt, which was filled with thousands of 
steel pellets and plastic explosives. The explosion killed Dhanu, Gandhi, several others in the 
crowd, and injured many more.1  
This attack made Dhanu the most prominent female suicide attacker of the LTTE and 
perhaps the world. First, as former and running Prime Minister of India, her victim was the 
highest profile of any suicide mission. Second, her attack was extraordinarily lethal. Robert Pape 
calls her one of the three most deadly suicide attackers in the past twenty years, along with Saeed 
Hotari of Hamas and 9/11 attacker Mohammed Atta.2 Third, Dhanu was the first attacker to use a 
suicide belt. The success of the invention and her mission inspired many groups to begin using 
similar devices in their suicide attacks.3 And last, some argue that the assassination is responsible 
for much of the LTTE’s extreme reputation.4 
 The novelty of the assassination and the uniqueness of the circumstances inspired many 
reactions from a multitude of perspectives. What is interesting about Dhanu’s case is that the 
emphasis is on her status as a possible rape victim. Many stories claim that she was a victim of 
sexual assault by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces, and sought revenge against their leader as a 
result. These accounts argue that she is unique not because of the notoriety of her crime, but 
because she was a woman who had been dishonored. In this chapter I argue that this narrative, 
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Dhanu as armed rape victim, was a rhetorical strategy adopted by the LTTE and accepted and 
spread by others in order to counteract the reality of her extreme violence. 
To show the power of this narrative, I will first explain the relationship between rape and 
nationalism. Next I explain Dhanu’s importance and how and where the narrative about her 
appears. Lastly, I will conclude with the implications of this narrative. 
 
RAPE AND TAMIL EELAM 
  In ethno-nationalist conflicts, rape is often treated as an ethnic crime, not necessarily a 
gendered one. When a Tamil woman is raped, it is perceived as bringing harm upon the culture, 
not on the individual woman.5 When rape is used as a military tool in these conflicts, it is a 
method of permeating the boundaries between the two groups, as well as causing terror and pain 
against civilian populations. This damage to culture and woman is perceived to be permanent. 
Sympathetic friends and family will keep rape a secret to protect the survivor, while others 
perceive the damage as so severe that many women are murdered by their families when rape is 
discovered.6  
If civilian women’s chastity is a placeholder for the honor of the nation, then female 
combatants who have pledged to protect that nation are burdened with even more responsibility. 
As Herath explains,  
[T]he gendering of nationalist discourse urges women to be sexually chaste. The 
combatant’s womanhood is de-sexualised and her sexual desires are contained within that 
role where they accept the renouncing of sexuality unquestioningly and as justifiable due 
to forming a part of a constructed role of an armed combatant.7 
40 
As an agent of nationalism, the female combatant must protect her chastity with the same 
ferocity as she protects her nation. In Sri Lanka, as with many similar conflicts, the suffering 
group then exploits instances of rape to mobilize its population.8 Ramachandran points out, “In a 
society where chastity is the ultimate virtue, linking rape with loss of chastity enables the LTTE 
to exploit the vulnerability of rape victims.”9 This is certainly true in Dhanu’s case. As Herath 
further explains,  
[E]thnic sentiments of the violation of female honour take precedence in public 
discourse, within which women are reconstructed as craving vengeance for the disgrace 
they suffered hence Dhanu was portrayed to the world as an avenging victim of a rape.10 
Dhanu, as rape victim, became the representative for Tamil culture, and her act of vengeance 
became tied to protection of the Tamil nation. Interestingly enough, the LTTE is known for its 
abstention of rape as a military tactic, which is a rare phenomenon in modern ethnic conflicts.11 
However, the LTTE was not unskilled in manipulating stories about women for its own 
gain. It is thought that rape victims were common recruits for the LTTE.12 The LTTE is said to 
use cases of rape to foment anger and revenge in women, and encourage them to become 
martyrs.  They convince women that attack against the enemy is the best way to avenge the 
attack on themselves.13 As Sudha Ramachandran puts it, “That hopelessness makes her a 
valuable weapon in the LTTE’s arsenal, a willing martyr for the Tigers’ cause.”14 A victim can 
live in fear of her life in the civilian community, or join a group that claims to be understanding 
of her situation and pledges to value her as a member of their armed struggle.15 As Beyler puts it, 
“because they could not be considered women, they could undertake a man’s task that would 
redeem their status (of victims of rape) by dying for a good cause.”16 
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Manipulating the victim status of female suicide attackers was also a way that the LTTE 
could win the hearts and minds of its population. Placing a cause behind her actions, especially a 
cause that inflamed nationalist reactions like rape, was a way to justify them:  
The group could attract new media attention by offering its female fighters up for 
interviews and contrasting their stories of abuse by the GOSL and later the IPKF with 
their empowerment by the LTTE. In this area, the LTTE has been remarkably successful. 
Media coverage of women in the LTTE is rarely critical of the group, and almost never 
critical of the women even when reporting on suicide bombers. Indeed, it tends to focus 
more on the women as women or victims rather than on their acts of violence.17 
In this sense, it provided an outlet for anger and nationalist violence, but funneled it away from 
the LTTE itself. 
 Inside the LTTE, the narrative of Dhanu as a rape victim has successfully played on other 
women’s fears and encouraged membership. Dhanu’s actions became representative of a 
possibility of agency for other Tamil women. Herath explains, 
By successfully carrying out such an onerous task she was elevated to an equal status 
with male combatants. Her action in targeted the key player in the ill-fated Indo-Lanka 
Peace Accord redresses a number of misdeeds, including the violation of her own and 
other women’s bodies, as well as her country.18 
She became the representative of the Tamil nation. Scholars have called her a “heroine and 
symbol of the LTTE,” her image achieving “mythic proportions,”19 a “mythical force,”20 “a 
symbol of ‘sacrifice’ by the Tigresses,” 21 and an “iconic [image] of sexual violence.”22 Her 
image was the catalyst for a dramatic increase in female LTTE membership after the Gandhi 
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assassination.23 In fact, LTTE women are said to carry a picture of Dhanu with them for 
inspiration and protection.24 
 
THE RAPE VICTIM AND SUICIDE ATTACKS 
 Obviously, stories about rape make for a very powerful narrative in Tamil society and the 
LTTE. Its influence explains its effectiveness in recruitment and propaganda for the LTTE. The 
power of rape stigmas also create a natural environment for suicide attacks to thrive in. As 
mentioned above, the cultural expectations for a victim of rape are grim. She is at least triply 
victimized; by perpetrator, culture, and self. In Tamil society, suicide is an acceptable response 
to a situation like this. As mentioned earlier, suicide is viewed as a heroic response to suffering, 
and rape is no different.  
 Rape and suicide are paired in many circumstances. During the Indian Partition in 1947 
many family members encouraged women to commit suicide to avoid rape at the hands of Indian 
forces.25 The LTTE perpetuates this same mindset. All LTTE members are encouraged to 
commit suicide using their cyanide capsules if captured or compromised in some way. For 
women, this includes committing suicide to avoid rape by the Sri Lankan Army foces.26 As 
mentioned above, LTTE women are responsible for protecting their chastity, and often, they do 
this through sacrificing their lives. Herath explains: “The justification for this act of suicide lies 
in both the bodily integrity of the individual and in the collective morality of the revolutionary 
group as a whole.”27 During an interview, one female member of the LTTE echoed this mindset, 
saying, “A man can be tortured…But a woman has more to lose—her virtue. Anyway, being 
captured alive is a blow to the pride of a Freedom Fighter. Suicide is an act of human dignity.”28  
43 
 For a woman who has already suffered rape at the hands of the enemy, the solution is the 
same. Shunned from their communities, women can still serve the cause by sacrificing their 
lives. Davis explains,  
[S]uicide bombings are an acceptable offering from women who can never be mothers. 
The theme of the ‘soiled’ woman martyring herself for a cause is seen throughout secular 
and religious struggles. In this way, women continue to adhere to the gender norms of 
Tamil society while supporting the cause and providing important personnel to the 
LTTE.29 
Even as victims, women who join the LTTE can continue to represent their nation and get a 
chance at restoring their honor.30 
 Unquestionably, rape and suicide are intimately tied in this context. After the IPKF’s 
deployment in Sri Lanka, the LTTE was the only available Tamil resistance group left. “And 
since there was no other militant group apart from the LTTE that was fighting the IPKF and the 
Lankan armed forces from 1987 onwards, it was natural that all women who wanted to pick up a 
gun would now join the LTTE.”31 When the options are dishonor or murder at the hands of your 
family, joining the LTTE seems like a rational choice.  
Even women who were not survivors of rape themselves but who had heard other 
women’s stories or simply wanted to be able to protect themselves from those experiences would 
also join.32  Fear of rape is a commonly cited reason for joining the LTTE. 33 One Tamil source 
said, 
Witnessing rape, witnessing or hearing about rape from other villagers and the Army’s 
killing of Tamil youth (girls and boys arrested by Sri Lankan Army)…and the feeling of 
44 
helplessness in not being able to defend against the Sri Lankan Army, are the main 
reasons for the girls joining the LTTE.34 
A female LTTE member echoed this sentiment when she said, “Instead of being raped by the 
enemy soldiers and dying screaming, I can now defend myself with this weapon.  For me, this is 
freedom.”35 As de Mel points out, “In these speculations, motives of reclaiming lost honour and 
revenge for a sexual violation appear as a reiterated, circulating narrative. This is a discourse, 
markedly, that does not accrue around the male suicide bomber.”36 
However, many argue that rape is not a deciding factor for the LTTE’s female suicide 
attackers. Gunawardena argues that, in known cases of women who were survivors of rape, they 
did not join the LTTE, much less become Black Tigers.37  While acknowledging that rape was a 
common tactic of war for the IPKF during their stint in Sri Lanka, she maintains, “there is little 
evidence to suggest or support the contention that females raped by the IPKF turned to suicide 
terrorism as a means of revenge or as a redeeming option.”38 She also notes that “while there 
have been instances of rape, in the known cases the victims did not become Black Tigers or even 
members of the LTTE. This was a myth advanced by the LTTE itself for disinformation 
purposes, but finds little corroboration in reality.”39 
In fact, if Dhanu’s motivation was personal revenge, that certainly doesn’t explain the 
team dispatched to kill Gandhi, nor the other women on the scene as backup.40 Four died during 
the explosion, and many of the rest, in true LTTE fashion, swallowed their vials of cyanide.41 
Other evidence suggests that the motivation for the assassination was organizational as well. The 
attack took place on Gandhi’s campaign trail. One of his policy platforms had been to send 
Indian troops back to Sri Lanka to teach Prabhakaran a lesson for breaking the Indo-Sri Lanka 
Agreement.42 Many believe that this was the true motivation behind the attack. She was not 
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alone on the scene nor with her intentions to kill Gandhi.  The narrative that arose, however, told 
a different story. 
 
THE LTTE’S MESSAGE 
Despite her celebrity as arguably the most famous, lethal and innovative female suicide 
attacker in the world, very little is actually known about Dhanu. The LTTE is a very secretive 
group, and the Black Tigers especially so. First, the LTTE is known to remain silent after suicide 
missions, and rarely, if ever, takes credit for them. Second, the Black Tigers are chosen and carry 
out their missions in total secrecy. Often, only the LTTE’s leader and his closest associate know 
who is being readied for suicide missions.43 As in Dhanu’s case, most Black Tigers are revealed 
only after their missions, if at all.44 As de Mel notes, “The secrecy that surrounds the LTTE 
suicide bomber makes her subjectivity available to the public only at the precise moment in 
which she is silenced, and silences herself through her final act of violence.”45 
The LTTE deviated from their culture of silence to deny culpability while at the same 
time releasing a statement to rationalize the act.46 That the LTTE would choose a narrative about 
rape is extremely telling. Dhanu was the first female suicide attacker tied to the LTTE--the 
rhetorical strategy chosen demonstrated recognition that this situation required some narrative 
support. After the assassination and her death, the LTTE released a statement that Dhanu had 
been raped at the hands of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF), and that “her act of violence 
was a fitting revenge for her shame and trauma.”47 
 The rape narrative was potentially a boon for the LTTE. They could deny culpability to a 
society still resistant to the idea of female fighters, as well as to the world at large. If Dhanu was 
in fact a victim of rape bent on revenge, then the LTTE could not have been the mastermind 
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behind the attack. As Davis explains, “In an effort to accommodate the traditional views in Tamil 
society about women in combat, women who join the LTTE are often portrayed by the 
organization as rape victims of the SLA or the IPKF.”48 She explains further that “rape by IPKF 
soldiers was often cited as a motive for a suicide bombing, reframing the attack as a personal 
vendetta rather than a politically motivated assassination.”49 For the LTTE, releasing a statement 
about Dhanu that vilified the IPKF while at the same time deflecting blame from Dhanu and their 
own organization was a no-lose strategy. As Gunawardena states,  
By portraying the participation of the ‘weaker’ sex as the victim of circumstances (e.g., 
rape) that drove these women to desperate measures, women are in fact used (or abused) 
as a justification for suicide terrorism, or at the very least in the case of the LTTE to 
make Black Tiger operations/suicide terrorism acceptable to the world at large. This 
disinformation was the main justification put forward by the LTTE for the suicide attack 
on Rajiv Gandhi, wherein the bomber was portrayed as the victim of an IPKF rape and 
that the attack was more her personal vendetta rather than a politically motivated 
assassination.50 
The LTTE’s narrative about Dhanu played on conservative conceptions of women to protect 
their reputation.  
 
DHANU’S MOTIVATION 
 When the LTTE first released their statement about Dhanu, “Little attention was paid to 
this statement in relation to the initial shock and confusion that was caused by the killing.”51 
Since then, however, it has been picked up in a multitude of places. It has taken hold in many 
different media, appearing in Sri Lankan newspapers, US academic works, Tamil websites, 
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major Asian news outlets, and even a US women’s fashion magazine. It seems that there are two 
possibilities here. Either these media have picked up the LTTE’s narrative about Dhanu and run 
with it or they have independently created the same narrative. Either way, the similarities of the 
narratives demonstrates its power.  
The Dhanu narratives all use rape as a justification for Dhanu’s actions, albeit with 
different rationalizations. The different narratives say her rape has made her a victim, exploited, 
vengeful, or even mentally ill. My argument is that all of these trends have two things in 
common: they all stem from the rape narrative and they all aim to rationalize Dhanu’s violence, 
or, make it less dangerous.  
The most obvious theme in the narrative is simply the importance of rape to female 
suicide attackers in general. Marie Claire, a popular women’s fashion magazine in the U.S., ran 
an article called “When the Suicide Bomber is a Woman,” by Jan Goodwin.  The article then 
reappeared in several places, such as the Asian Tribune, Lanka eNews, and Colombo Beat, 
among others.  The article describes the life of a captured LTTE female suicide bomber, Menake.  
Goodwin interviewed Menake, who was purchasing a shirt to conceal an explosive belt when she 
was picked up by Sri Lankan police. Interestingly, Goodwin explicitly ties Menake to Dhanu.  
Menake was the victim of rape and molestation at the hands of her father when she was a girl, 
and Goodwin believes that this connects her to Dhanu:  
Rape is something many female suicide bombers have in common. Considered spoiled 
goods and unmarriageable in their patriarchal cultures, they view becoming human 
bombs as a form of purification by fire. Dhanu, Prime Minister Gandhi’s assassin, was 
also allegedly raped by soldiers from the Indian Peacekeeping Force when it was posted 
in Sri Lanka for three years. 52 
48 
Menake, like Dhanu, is a woman with a tragic background. The conclusion is that when women 
choose suicide bombing, it must be the result of a personal indignity that they have suffered.  
The decision is framed as a selfish and personal choice by a woman for her own purposes.  
 Another aspect of the narrative is that Dhanu was a character who had been irreparably 
spoiled by her rape, and thus, easily exploited by the men around her. The article “Dishonor or 
Death—A Woman’s Choice” by Sudha Ramachandran makes this explicit, right in the title.  
Women who have been spoiled by rape can either live with their dishonor, or choose the path of 
suicide bombing.  It frames the “choice” as one that only dishonored women have the option of 
taking.  Ramachandran explicitly raises the issue of Dhanu’s alleged rape: 
Dhanu, the suicide bomber who assassinated Indian [P]rime [M]inister Rajiv Gandhi, is 
said to have been a victim of rape by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. Rape victims, it 
seems are a valuable weapon in the arsenal of militant groups that carry out suicide 
missions.53 
Here, Ramachandran adds something new to the narrative. Dhanu was raped by the IPKF, yes.  
But her rape readied her to become a victim again, this time to calculating men with nefarious 
plans. The allusion is that the LTTE had a political goal (to fight for Eelam), and that men in the 
group exploited her dishonorable status and used her for their dubious plans. It was not Dhanu 
who could have been an LTTE ideologue, but her male handlers: 
Women like…Dhanu might have volunteered to become suicide bombers. But it is likely 
that their emotions, feelings of worthlessness and insecurities would have been nurtured 
and exploited to push them to volunteer. In the process, they became willing weapons in 
the hands of their leaders.54 
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This representation of Dhanu paints her as doubly victimized—she suffered at the hands of the 
Indian Peace Keeping Forces, and again at the hands of her organization, the LTTE.  
 Websites run by Tamils and LTTE sympathizers repeat this same depiction, with minor 
changes. The Tamil Nation website describes Dhanu’s involvement with the LTTE: 
An experienced covert operative—whether a Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla or a Sri Lankan 
intelligence operative—could have ‘persuaded’ a suitable young Tamil lady raped by 
Indian soldiers and thus enraged against Rajiv Gandhi, to act as a suicide-assassin. (The 
assassin, Dhanu, allegedly told her friend, Nalini, that Indian soldiers had raped her. The 
fact that Indian soldiers raped some Tamil women has been established beyond any 
doubt; if Dhanu was a rape victim may never be known for sure.)55 
Here, Dhanu’s emotions and dishonor had such a hold on her that she was an easy target for 
“experienced” actors to persuade her to give up her life.  Dhanu was a “suitable” (read: chaste, 
honorable) woman who had been stripped of her reputation by the IPKF.  So angered by this 
injury to her character, she was easily driven to her role as suicide bomber.  This depiction 
recognizes that the rape allegation could well be a fiction, but continues to emphasize it as the 
basis for the account.  
 Dhanu as a victim is a powerful facet of this narrative. On a Canadian Tamil website 
discussing the investigation of Gandhi’s assassination, there is a dialogue about whether Dhanu 
committed the act as a victim of rape, or as a young girl brainwashed by a her LTTE-supporting 
father from birth.   
Dhanu…was inspired by the Tamil liberation movement at a very young age. In fact, her 
father, A. Rajaratnam, who is described as Pirabhakaran’s mentor, played a crucial role in 
moulding the LTTE chief’s thinking during the movement’s formative years between 
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1972 and 1975. His articles were published in pro-LTTE magazines… And the SIT 
[Special Investigation Team] is now producing these articles as evidence to bolster its 
argument that Dhanu had been indoctrinated by her father and this is what motivated the 
crime rather than her reported rape by the IPKF which, the SIT believes, is part of a 
disinformation campaign spread by the LTTE. 56 
Here Dhanu is not vengeful, but a pawn of the LTTE.  She had been brainwashed by her family 
and culture to commit the act.  It was not her decision, but the result of actions of the men who 
surrounded her.57 (In fact, Dhanu’s father was given a medal by Prabhakaran after the attack.58) 
 A brainwashed Dhanu may make her actions more palatable, but a mentally ill Dhanu 
even more so. Citizens, a journalistic website in Sri Lanka, published this account of her mental 
well-being: 
According to unconfirmed sources Dhanu was raped by the IPKF... She may have 
suffered from RTS or Rape Trauma Syndrome. RTS which is a form of interpersonal 
violence generates a wider range of conflicting emotions. The victims often have a loss of 
faith about their sense of safety in society and may feel powerless.  Depression and anger 
after the rape are common features in RTS. Hence Dhanu’s anger and frustration was 
projected to the former premier Rajiv Gandhi.59 
In this depiction, Dhanu was prisoner to her emotions.  She was a vengeful, hysterical woman 
whose emotions manipulated her into blaming Rajiv Gandhi instead of her attackers.  Again, she 
is not rational or any kind of agent, but a victim.   
 In another article, this one by Tapan Kumar Bose, we discover that Dhanu’s decision was 
the result of her rape and lack of retribution for the crimes that the suffered.  Here the author 
states,  
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Dhanu, the young Sri Lankan Tamil woman who became the human bomb that killed 
Rajiv Gandhi, India’s former Prime Minister was reportedly raped by members of Indian 
Peace Keeping Force in Jaffana. These allegations were denied. Through her action, 
Dhanu proved her complaint.60 
Because the IPKF was not investigated or held accountable to the appropriate authorities for 
sexual assaults, Dhanu takes matters into her own hands.  Here she is an agent, but only insofar 
as a reactionary force.  She once again is a revenge-seeking woman. 
 The narrative can also be found in U.S. academic circles. Perhaps the most interesting 
appearance of this narrative was in the debate over Dhanu in the New York Review of Books. The 
question of Dhanu’s rape became a controversial topic between two prominent scholars, Mia 
Bloom and Christian Caryl. This high-profile debate highlighed the salience of the narrative and 
the very existence of this debate tells us that something is at stake here. 
 Mia Bloom’s book, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, has an entire chapter 
entitled, “Feminism, Rape and War: Engendering Suicide Terror?” She mentions Dhanu’s rape 
explicitly in several places in her book, as well as articles that she has written. In one article, she 
writes, 
In many instances, the women are seeking revenge. Consider, for example, the women 
who join the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)…According to anthropologist 
Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, the government has committed organized violence 
against the Tamils through a systematic campaign of disappearances, rape, checkpoint 
searches, and torture—as well as the elimination of whole villages in remote areas.61 
In another,  
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that many women bombers have been raped or sexually 
abused either by representatives of the state of by insurgents—thereby contributing to a 
sense of humiliation and powerlessness, made only worse by stigmatization within their 
own societies. 62 
Clearly, Bloom believes that rape is a common motivating factor for many female suicide 
attackers. She explicitly makes this link to Dhanu in her book,  
Dhanu herself was supposedly the victim of rape although other sources claim that it was 
her mother who was raped by Indian security services during the Indian Intervention 
between 1987-1990 and that she was avenging her mother when she killed Prime 
Minister Gandhi…Fighting for Tamil freedom might haven been the only way for such a 
woman to redeem herself.63 
Bloom does admit, however, that Dhanu’s rape “remains one of intense debate and 
controversy.”64 The reason, however, is not that she was not a victim. The controversy, Bloom 
argues, is whether or not she was raped, or her mother was raped or brother had been killed!65 In 
any of these possible scenarios, Dhanu is a victim.  
 In a review of Bloom’s book, “Why They Do It” by Christian Caryl, he overstates 
Bloom’s claim and tells readers that Dhanu was certainly gang-raped by Indian Peace Keeping 
forces and this was her primary motivation: 
Mia Bloom in her study Dying to Kill suggests that having been a victim of sexual 
violence may be a motive for the surprisingly large number of female bombers. Dhanu, 
Gandhi’s assassin, had been gang-raped by enemy soldiers…For such victims, there may  
be no way back into traditional society, and a suicide attack on the enemy may be one 
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way to restore lost ‘honor.’ Male bombers often seem to be seeking retribution for a 
broader sense of humiliation, perhaps at the hands of an occupier.66 
Bloom responds, also in the New York Review of Books, this way:  
In Christian Caryl's review ‘Why They Do It’…he alleges that I have written that Dhanu, 
the woman who assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, was gang-raped. Allegations of 
Dhanu's rape have never been proven and sources within the Indian government assert 
that she was still a virgin at the time of her death. Although such sources have cause to 
lie, in my interviews with the Tamil Tigers, they too do not think she was actually raped. 
There have been questions raised about whether her mother might have been the victim 
of sexual abuse by the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) when they intervened in the 
coun-try in 1987–1990, but the main reason why Dhanu became a Tiger is that her 
brother was a well-known cadre who had died and she was carrying on the family 
tradition... the story as it stands now in the current issue attributes to me an exaggeration 
of the facts I would not make.67 
Here, Bloom, while aiming to deemphasize the rape allegation, continues to defend the non-
political motivation for Dhanu, revenge.  Caryl replies: 
My apologies to Ms. Bloom. I did indeed overstate the case in my paraphrase of her 
description of Dhanu. It is by no means a firmly established fact that Dhanu was gang-
raped by Indian soldiers. It would seem, however, that some sort of sexual violence—
either against her personally or someone in her family—may have served as an additional 
motive for her attack on Gandhi. In any case, I stand corrected. 68 
We see the importance of the rape allegation for Dhanu.  Bloom objects to Caryl’s avocation of 
the rape story, and while he apologizes, he reasserts that she must have been a victim of sexual 
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violence, or someone in her family was.  Despite the author’s objection to the distortion of their 
work, this reviewer cannot understand Dhanu’s actions outside of her being a victim. 
 That this debate took place in the New York Review of Books demonstrates the 
importance of this narrative. Neither author knows the truth of Dhanu’s experience. But the 
tension over the subject indicates that both understand the importance of the narrative. 
 The Sri Lankan newspaper, The Island, which appears to have quite a Sinhalese bias, 
offers a different picture of Dhanu.  Every article in their archives that mentions her does so only 
in passing and some do not mention her gender much at all.  Referring to the LTTE’s plan to 
assassinate Gandhi, it states, “Being a one-track minded militant group, it pre-empted Rajiv's 
come back through the simple expedient of physical annihilation. Dhanu, a young suicide 
bomber, was sent to do the job, which she did with amazing precision.”69 
 This depiction is different from other Tamil and Western sources.  As an LTTE enemy, a 
Sinhalese source would seek to demonize an LTTE agent as much as possible, and do little to 
blame her circumstances.  I found a single reference to sexual violence: “The LTTE and its 
sympathisers [sic] had suggested that a woman suicide cadre was used to avenge the humiliation 
the Tamil women suffered at the hands of the Indian Army. The LTTE had accused the Indian 
Army of rape of a large number of Tamil women.”70  This makes the rape allegation sound 
doubtful and unconvincing, rather different than the certainty we find in Caryl and others.  The 
Sinhalese source seeks to place all blame on Dhanu. It does not allow for the same forgiveness or 
recognition of mitigating circumstances.  The blame falls squarely on the rational, and effective, 
suicide bomber.  Ironically, these accounts give her the most agency and responsibility for her 
actions.  
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Even if the LTTE’s statement following Gandhi’s assassination were true, it does not 
deny the power of the narrative about Dhanu. Even if Dhanu was raped, and acted alone or with 
the LTTE, the focus on the rape is still telling. Rhetorically speaking, the narrative surrounding 
Dhanu is much more important than the truth of the matter. Narratives, the representations of a 
society’s heroes, are what are remembered most. If people believe it to be true, it is. In Dhanu’s 
case, the narrative has had real ramifications. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The specificity of this rhetorical explanation should concern us.  As I argued above, the 
secrecy of the LTTE and lack of record of Dhanu before her death make it highly unlikely that 
any reliable history or account of her motivations would exist.  In almost no instance did I find 
an account of Dhanu’s beliefs, ideology, or involvement with the LTTE prior to her existence as 
a suicide bomber.  Despite the fact that this act was extreme and violent, she is described almost 
universally as a victim.  She was a victim of rape, brainwashing, and even of her own delusions.  
Many of these conceptions place Dhanu at the mercy of men’s harmful decisions to rape or 
manipulate.  Others, appealing to the common stereotype of the hysterical woman, put her at the 
mercy of her emotions and irrational thoughts.  None depict her as a rational decision maker or 
political agent.  The vacuum of her history was filled only with depictions of her as victim. 
 Women like Dhanu break almost all stereotypes of traditional women, especially when 
they emerge from extremely patriarchal societies.  Instead of giving life, they take life.  Instead 
of working for peace, they escalate violence.  However women come to choose this path, many 
do choose it.  Dhanu’s case proves that a dominant reaction to women’s violence is to create an 
image that paints the woman as the “real” victim of violence.  And given the lack of information, 
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all we have to go on are the realities that we create with our depictions of women like Dhanu, 
female suicide bombers.  Dhanu silenced herself just as she became open to us. By defining 
female violence as only acceptable as a reaction to a personal grievance, these discourses 
effectively close off the possibility that Dhanu could have been a rational perpetrator of violence.   
Mia Bloom asks and answers, “Was Dhanu seeking to avenge her ruined honor, to achieve status 
within her culture, or to express her personal rage?  It is impossible to know for sure.”71 
 As I mentioned above, Dhanu was the first suicide attacker in the world to use the suicide 
belt. The belt was designed to make her look pregnant,72 and yet, mention of this is scarce in 
coverage of Dhanu and overshadowed by the debate over her status as a rape victim. In the next 
chapter I discuss the narrative of the mother warrior as a more recent rhetorical strategy by the 
LTTE and examine its effectiveness, and aim to explain why this obvious physical trait seems to 
have been lost in her narrative.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For three weeks, an LTTE female suicide attacker, Anoja, attended maternity classes at a 
Sri Lankan military hospital. Posing as the pregnant wife of a Sri Lankan army official, the 
attacker blew herself up in front of the hospital in an attempt to kill Sri Lankan Army 
Commander Lt. General Serath Fonseka. He survived the attack, but eight others died.1  
 This is a remarkable case. The LTTE had been deploying suicide attacks for nineteen 
years, and female suicide attackers for fifteen of those years. Sri Lankan officials were well 
aware of this threat; yet, an LTTE suicide attacker was able to gain access to their military 
headquarters in Sri Lanka’s capital. The woman, now believed to be named Anoja, successfully 
gave the impression of a pregnant woman, and used that impression of innocence to allow her to 
successfully carry out her suicide mission.2 This attack is also cited as the game-changer in the 
Sri Lankan civil war; it catalyzed the final assaults that led to the LTTE’s eventual demise.3 In 
this way, the female suicide attacker played an important and unique role in the conflict. 
Posing as an expectant mother, she is the perfect example of the “mother warrior” 
narrative that permeates LTTE messages about its female suicide attackers. In this chapter I 
argue that the mother warrior narrative has been ineffective in lending legitimacy to the suicide 
attacker’s actions. The LTTE’s mother warrior has successfully married the two roles of mother 
and suicide attacker, and was effective in that it appeared in many representations. However, it 
backfired when it overstepped its bounds; when it attempted to transfer from female combatants 
to female suicide attackers and when it was considered to be deploying actual mothers instead of 
a motherhood metaphor. 
To explain the importance and implications of this narrative, first I will discuss the 
foundation of this particular narrative, the interactions between gender and nationalism. Next, I 
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will analyze the narrative itself and its functions. Lastly, I conclude with the importance of this 
narrative and what it means for the women who are represented. 
 
THE MOTHERS OF TAMIL EELAM 
 Women are integral to the LTTE’s brand of nationalism. Skaine notes, “Women’s 
identity is a core symbol of the nation’s identity, and to the LTTE, their nationalism.”4 Even 
more, mothers occupy a special place in the quest for Tamil Eelam. De Alwis makes this 
connection: 
In Sri Lanka, where much of the nationalist rhetoric was, and continues to be phrased in 
terms of a Motherland and a mother tongue, the idealisation of womanhood signified 
through the construction of the ‘respectable lady,’ the repository of tradition and 
domesticity, is based on a valourisation of motherhood: as the creator and protector of the 
home, as the chaste and industrious wife and as the iconic representation of the nation.5 
The mother is a symbol of the nation. She represents the common homeland, language, and 
tradition. And in Tamil society, a mother’s duty is to look after others, and this duty changed 
only slightly with wartime.6 Women were to protect the home, take care of children, and rebuild 
when the conflict was done. Women were the bastions of peace while men battled around them. 
Schrijvers echoes this, stating women were expected to “be brave: in times of conflict, mothers 
should be willing to send their husbands and sons to the battlefield for the well-being of their 
nation.”7 Women’s participation in the nationalist war was to plead for peace or produce sons to 
fight, not to fight.  
This dominant representation had to change when the LTTE began including women 
among its fighting forces. Traditional notions of gender weren’t compatible with women taking 
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up arms or using explosives to kill themselves and others. Especially in South Asian conflicts, 
according to Chenoy, “The mother becomes the ‘mother of the nation’; she can plead for justice 
on behalf of herself and the nation and give her sons up for the nation. She can ask for peace or 
sustain the nationalism necessary for war. This image conforms to the feminine ‘other’ of the 
warrior.”8 Traditionally, the role of the mother was set in opposition to that of the warrior. As 
Schrijvers explains:   
The prevailing discourses in the Tamil community contain completely contradictory 
images of ‘woman’ and ‘womanhood.’ The ‘ideal woman,’ both traditionally and as a 
reaction to the presumed ‘collapse of family values,’ is represented as the secluded, male-
dependent housewife. In contrast, the aggressive woman soldier and suicide bomber 
stands out as a pillar of LTTE ideology.9 
The LTTE needed a safe representation of its female combatants to keep the support of 
its Tamil population base. In fact, several scholars argue that the LTTE was able to gain popular 
support and remain the leading Tamil resistance group because of its explicit support of 
traditional values. In order to win the propaganda battle, while maintaining the shock value of 
their female combatants, its growing ranks of female fighters needed acceptance by the larger 
society. As Gonsalves explains, 
Whenever social mores are transgressed, to avoid chaotic backlash, explanations and 
justifications have to be carefully constructed to assuage society and walk members 
through to the new model. New paradigms never emerge without an anchor to their 
predecessors and this is especially true in strongly patriarchal societies. 10 
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Naturally, the narrative emerged that attempted to tie the popular conception of the nationalist 
mother to the nationalist fighter of the LTTE. To smooth the transition to female combatants, the 
LTTE latched onto an existing narrative that was comfortable, familiar, and acceptable. 
 
THE MOTHER WARRIOR 
 The “mother warrior” united traditional, nationalist conceptions of the mother with the 
new roles of female combatants. Brun describes the mother warrior: 
The warrior mother is an image integrating expectations of women being brave mothers 
and warriors fighting for their nation and children. The image of a woman cadre with a 
baby in one hand and a gun in the other is a common image of woman fighters 
worldwide. The picture not only conjures images of the ‘can-do-everything superwoman’ 
but also implies that warfare can transform women’s role and sense of self-worth while 
also sustaining the social order that has ensured the reproduction and nurturing of the 
next generation.11 
The mother warrior appears in Tamil messages explicitly. The mother warrior, often seen as the 
mother holding a baby in one arm and a rifle in the other, appeared in LTTE literature. The 
image was a visual representation of the mother warrior narrative, which was a union of 
traditional feminine roles with the new, violent one.  
This double role clearly appears in LTTE messages. The head of the LTTE women’s 
political wing, described her female combatants this way, 
In our homes we all have poultry. The mother hen looks after her chicks with love and 
care. When you look at the mother hen she looks gentle, soft and very loving. But if a 
hawk comes down to catch one of the chicks, the mother hen will immediately jump up 
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and fight with the hawk to protect her chicks. So the strength she gets to fight with the 
hawk comes from her gentleness and her motherhood. We also love our community. And 
we want to protect them because we felt the responsibility to protect our community we 
had to become fighters.12 
The message is quite clear. Female combatants are mother hens, protecting their chicks, the 
Tamil community, from the onslaught of the Sri Lankan hawks. Despite the obvious 
contradiction between traditional motherhood values and the actions of the female combatant, 
this image has been pervasive in LTTE and other literature.  
The charge of a proper nationalist woman, in a civil war with declining male combatants, 
was to take up the nation’s cause directly. In this way, “Women were then not just reproducers of 
potential heroes but also heroes themselves…the image of the mother remained embedded within 
this new role of the militant.”13  
As the definition above hints, the mother warrior is traditional in many senses. She 
reproduces, protects, and sacrifices, just as traditional mothers do. I will discuss these 
characteristics in turn. First, she continues to be focused on reproduction. As Maunaguru states,  
The role of woman as the biological reproducer…was not abandoned. In fact, a currently 
dominant construction of the Tamil woman that has evolved, is one of a supernatural 
being performing two different but inter-connected duties for the ethnic group. The 
woman who holds an automatic rifle in one hand and a child in another has become a 
popular image of this supernatural Tamil woman.14 
The mother warrior retains her role as one who reproduces for the nation. According to this 
image, she is expected to keep up her childbearing duties while simultaneously taking up arms to 
defend Tamil Eelam. This image could also be read substituting the nation in for the child:  
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The symbolism here is potent, for the image of the mother protecting her child is a highly 
emotive one—it is after all our original ‘protector’/‘protected’ relationship. On one level 
it may be read as the Mother Country protecting her people...15 
The mother warrior also nurtures and protects. As Herath states,  
Women are symbolically linked to the roles of nurturer, regardless of their participation 
in violent acts such as suicide bombings. In times of war women do not lose their ability 
to be nurturers but narrow it down to their own hegemonic group, and focus their 
nurturing qualities to protect Tamil nationals and Tamil nationals only.16 
Through these images the mother-child relationship is grafted onto the combatant-nation 
relationship. The combatant is doing her national duty in protecting the nation, just as the mother 
hen protects her chicks when they are in danger.  
 An image so grounded in traditional gender roles is unsurprising given the conservative 
nature of Tamil society.  Tamil society is fairly traditional regarding gender roles, and has heavy 
constraints on women in the public sphere. The LTTE was faced with a problem. Either they 
could respect cultural Tamil norms and lose the most successful type of suicide attackers, or they 
could employ women and potentially anger their Tamil base. The “mother warrior” was a 
potential solution to this problem. The “mother warrior” blended traditional conceptions of 
motherhood with the extreme violence of the female suicide attacker. This union, Davis argues, 
was ideal for consumption by traditional society: “Using these images helped to serve as a 
transitional mechanism for both society and women by marrying traditional with nontraditional 
gender roles.” 17  
It is likely that the LTTE took the public relations offensive to counteract backlash, even 
from their own community. Despite the fact that so many Tamil women had joined the LTTE, 
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and their professed goal was to protect and promote the Tamil people, Tamils were still 
uncomfortable with LTTE women.  “The Tamils…are uncomfortable about women taking up 
arms and killing, even if it is to protect them.  Society is far more hostile to a female combatant 
than to a male combatant.  A woman combatant who leaves the LTTE and returns home is rarely 
welcomed back or accepted by her family and neighbourhood [sic], even in areas that are 
supportive of the LTTE.”18  For the LTTE, desperate for support in their battle against the Sri 
Lankan government, they would want to avoid serious incursions into Tamil culture.  As Patricia 
Whaley Eager explains,  
In order to understand how women are accepted as liberation fighters/terrorists/suicide 
bombers in extremely patriarchal societies such as Sri Lanka and Palestine, the leadership 
of these groups has to rationalize these otherwise forbidden acts by women so as not to 
upset the dominant cultural and gender norms.19 
This was especially important for the LTTE, who relied on sympathy and support from a 
population that valued their traditional values platform. The LTTE often used family metaphors 
to perpetuate this ideal. Cadres were expected to think of one another as brothers and sisters.20  
All desire was supposed to be directed towards the nation, not other cadres.21 In fact, people 
found to be having relationships were often executed. Two guards discovered to be in an intimate 
relationship suffered this fate, even though the woman involved was pregnant. Another woman 
found to be pregnant killed herself with her cyanide capsule to avoid discovery.22  On the 
surface, the actions of LTTE women would be seen as a far cry from what is allowed of 
traditional Tamil women. Policies like these are an attempt to force LTTE women to embody the 
docile, feminine image of their civilian counterparts. 
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 The traditional feminine image was the least threatening to the gender status quo. And 
the mother warrior was one way to achieve this. Davis points out that depicting female 
combatants as mothers allows them to break boundaries, but only temporarily: 
Images and themes used in public-relations campaigns have interwoven this idea so 
tightly as to suggest that as soon as the immediate threat recedes, the woman in the 
picture will put down the rifle and keep the baby, re-establishing traditional roles.23 
The representation aims to soothe opposition to female involvement in the LTTE by highlighting 
their innate feminine nature that will undoubtedly return when the conflict ends. As Macdonald 
says, this narrative is “a way of leaving women ‘holding the baby’ and excluding them from the 
political domain when the struggle is over.”24 
This narrative served many other purposes for the LTTE as well. One was military 
effectiveness: there are numerous strategic benefits of deploying women as suicide attackers 
(discussed in Chapter One). Another purpose is to gain sympathy for the cause. The extreme 
sacrifices that women make draw attention to the persecution of the Sri Lankan government 
against Tamils. The very fact that the LTTE has turned to using mothers, the sacred, peaceful, 
protectors of their nation, as human bombs is meant to demonstrate the desperation of their 
situation. Gunawardena states this clearly when she says,   
Although sending a female to self-destruct as a suicide bomber in itself departs from 
accepted conventions, against the backdrop of a three decade old ethnic conflict, it was 
condoned as a sacrifice, a necessity of circumstances, as an asymmetrical response to the 
much stronger adversary, the Sri Lanka military.25 
Confronted with mothers-turned-suicide-attackers, a common reaction is to assume that the 
situation must be desperate.  
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The motherhood narrative also aids with recruitment. The mother warrior is a model for 
other women, and a positive image for the families that these women come from. Since female 
combatants are seen as “mother warriors,” not warriors alone, the societal support is much 
higher. Serving the nationalist cause through the LTTE is deemed a legitimate course. In fact, 
“The LTTE actively applies specific representations of women warriors for several purposes, 
particularly to recruit new cadres to the movement and to nurture and sustain the identity and 
support by the disapora.”26  
Women in the group are reputed to be the LTTE’s most violent and extreme members.  
They model and exceed the expectations set for male members. This representation is quite 
useful to recruit men as well. The group often uses images of these women to convince families 
to not only accept their daughters’ participation, but to challenge males to meet the bar that 
female fighters had set.27   
All this is achieved without drastically challenging the gender status quo, and thus, Tamil 
society. As Gonsalves explains, “There is the underlying assumption that a wife or mother, no 
matter how radical she or her demands may be, will not pose a threat to the fundamental base of 
society.”28 Many have argued that female suicide attackers have not changed civilian Tamil 
conceptions of gender roles in any substantial way. In fact, as de Mel notes, “the notion of 
warrior-mother did not displace deep-seated notions of normative female identity which, through 
popular culture, the media, educational texts and family conditioning, continue to instruct the Sri 
Lankan woman on her symbolic value as a sexually chaste, enlightened, altruistic and maternal 
being.”29 
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THE MOTHER WARRIOR AND SUICIDE ATTACKS 
 The mother warrior narrative seems consistent with the nationalist project of the LTTE. 
Female combatants protect the nation as they would protect their children, and exemplify several 
of the positive characteristics associated with motherhood, such as nurturing and protecting. 
However, the LTTE seems to have erred in attempting to use the mother warrior narrative in 
regards to their female suicide attackers. While the narrative seems compatible with some 
characteristics of suicide attacks, as will be shown below, it ultimately backfired when applied to 
female suicide attackers.  
The role of sacrifice in motherhood coincides neatly with the mother warrior narrative. 
Sacrifice is an ideal for mothers—they should sacrifice in order to fully care for their husbands 
and families. For at least one woman combatant, all concerns about even their personal well-
being are less important than the cause for Eelam: 
[W]e don’t think about blood, think about dying or even think about our friends’ death.  
The only thing that comes in our mind is we have been given an activity and we need to 
complete and achieve the activity…Being in the LTTE and going to fight we know that 
people are trusting us, they are waiting for us, so we must take their load from them.30 
This combatant clearly believes that the Tamil nationalist cause should take precedence, and 
nothing else.  
Each member of the group is prepared to sacrifice for their comrades, the Tamil 
community, and for Tamil Eelam. Famously, LTTE members are known for sacrificing their 
own lives to protect other combatants. Each member wears a cyanide capsule around their neck. 
If they are captured or compromised in some way, they can quickly end their lives, and the risk 
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to other LTTE combatants. They sacrifice themselves to avoid providing the enemy with 
information that could hurt the LTTE.  
More concretely, many LTTE members claim to join to protect other Tamils. Most have 
joined because they have witnessed or heard about violence perpetrated by the Sri Lankan 
government against Tamils. They fight, sacrificing their lives for others. And lastly, as a 
nationalist movement, each member is fighting for a cause greater than themselves; the idea of a 
separate Tamil state, Eelam. Both men and women commonly cite fighting for Eelam as a 
motivation for joining the group.31  
 It seems consistent to link the ideas of sacrifice to the female suicide attacker. Suicide 
attacks are framed as a way that women, especially those who are not or cannot be mothers, can 
make sacrifices for the community: 
The self-sacrifice of the female bombers is almost an extension of the idea of motherhood 
in the Tamil culture, [as] in this strongly patriarchal society, Tamil mothers make great 
sacrifices for their sons on a daily basis; feeding them before themselves or the girl 
children, serving them and so on. Acting as a human bomb is an understood and accepted 
offering for a woman who will never be a mother.32 
For women who can’t give to society in the strictly traditional ways, their suicides can function 
as that sacrifice. In fact, instead of calling suicide attacks “suicide,” the LTTE prefers the Tamil 
phrase for “giving yourself.” 33 They focus less on the lives that they end and more on the 
sacrifice that one has made for others through that action. Just as for the combatants who take 
cyanide capsules, each personal sacrifice that a female suicide attacker makes gives life to the 
Tamil cause.34 
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The message of motherhood in this narrative functions to neutralize the female suicide 
attackers’ actions. The actions of a female combatant can be questioned as overly militaristic, 
violent, or unnatural—the actions of a mother can’t be. What a mother is forced to do to protect 
her children, in this case, her nation, is above scrutiny. Ironically, “there was no evidence to 
suggest that any of the female Black Tigers were mothers or for that matter married.”35 The 
“mother warrior” narrative is just that—a narrative. It is comfortable for society to imagine that 
those who are using suicide to kill others aren’t radical or deranged. Instead, they are women 
who are protecting the idea of Tamil Eelam just as a mother would attack if her children were in 
danger. Unlike the rape victim narrative surrounding Dhanu, the mother warrior narrative did not 
take hold around the Anoja as intended or placate external audiences. 
 
ANOJA’S  PREGNANCY TEST 
So far I have attempted to explain the consistency of the mother warrior narrative with 
the Tamil’s nationalist project. The narrative appears compatible with traditional Tamil culture. 
She bears children, nurtures and protects them, and makes sacrifices to keep them safe. The 
narrative serves as a metaphor for motherhood to ease the material tension between motherhood 
and suicide attacks. Unfortunately for the LTTE, however, mothers-as-suicide bombers are not 
treated as the national heroes that they would prefer.  
The strength of the mother warrior narrative ends at the boundaries of the narrative. That 
is, it has not been an effective rhetorical strategy to soothe societal fears about female suicide 
attackers. Anoja is a prime example. She posed as a pregnant woman in order to gain access to a 
high-security target, manipulating stereotypes about mothers in order to be a more effective 
combatant. According to the narrative, she should be championed as an effective mother warrior, 
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giving life to the Tamil cause and protecting her nation. Instead, a debate arose about her 
pregnancy status. Media coverage was obsessed with her supposed pregnancy, reading to 
denigrate the use of a “pregnant” woman in a suicide attack. The strength of norms about 
motherhood were simply too strong—even tying them to the nationalist project was not enough 
to overwhelm them. The mother warrior narrative was an effective rhetorical strategy in the 
abstract, perhaps with limited success for female combatants, but was not effective in 
neutralizing the opposition to mothers using suicide attacks. 
In fact, the media coverage was dominated by discussion of this female suicide attacker’s 
“pregnancy” rather than the actual attack. An Indian Express article said,  
The suicide bomber who blew up Sri Lankan Army chief’s motorcade used maternity day 
to enter the military compound in the heart of Colombo disguised as a pregnant 
woman…Mothers-to-be entering the Army hospital for a weekly maternity day are not 
subject to stringent security checks. Investigations had shown that the bomber—believed 
to be a member of the ‘Black Tiger’ suicide squad of the LTTE—had been driven from 
the gate of the high-security military compound to the Army hospital in an Army 
vehicle.36 
Here the focus is on this attacker’s disguise and her use of motherhood to fool the Sri Lankan 
army’s security apparatus. The power of traditional gender roles is apparent, and reflected in Sri 
Lankan policy. As this article states, pregnant women are explicitly not seen as a threat to 
security and the government does not waste resources on security checks. In this case, the 
pregnant status of the suicide attacker placed her entirely above suspicion. In fact, a Sri Lankan 
military vehicle transported an LTTE suicide attacker to her target! 
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Much of the coverage reflects the discomfort with a woman taking advantage of a 
pregnancy for destructive purposes. A BBC article stated,  
Military officials say the attacker was a woman who made herself appear heavily 
pregnant to conceal the explosives. She presented fake identification and said she had an 
ante-natal appointment at the army hospital inside the complex.37 
Another article reflects this tone:  
Tuesday’s attack involved a female suicide bomber, dressed as a pregnant woman, who 
pretended to be visiting the army hospital near the heavily-guarded, high security zone. 
She waited for the arrival of army chief, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, and 
detonated her explosives, killing eight people on the spot and wounding 27 others, mainly 
military personnel.38 
Another article entitled, “‘Pregnant’ Bomber Takes Isle to the Brink of Civil War,” phrased the 
attack this way: “Posing as a pregnant woman and showing forged identity documents, the Tamil 
bomber concealed explosives around her waist and set off her device next to a car carrying 
Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka.”39 Here, the attacker was again deviously posing as a mother 
to take advantage of the situation and attack the army official.  
Several articles reflect this sentiment, saying, “Fonseka survived an LTTE suicide bomb 
attack by a pregnant Tamil woman who infiltrated the army base by attending the regular 
maternity clinic provided for civilians”40 and “The woman was able to enter the area by 
presenting fake identification and saying she had an appointment for a pregnancy examination at 
the army hospital.” 41 The words “forged,” “infiltrated,” “fake identification,” all jump out. Her 
attack was to be condemned because she manipulated the security forces into thinking that she 
was a “real” mother.   
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 Shortly after the attack, a debate emerged about whether or not the attacker was in fact 
pregnant. One article claimed that she had gotten pregnant, and then took advantage of her 
circumstances for the Tamil cause: “The Tamil suicide bomber who targeted Sri Lanka's top 
general used her pregnancy to meticulously plan the attack, an investigator said. Officials 
previously said the bomber had only pretended to be pregnant, but the investigator said hospital 
records showed she actually was.”42 Other articles share this suspicion.43 
 However, several days later, the attacker’s pregnancy was again in question. An Asian 
Tribune article reported that the pregnancy was still under investigation. Labs were conducting 
new blood tests; they suspected that the previous samples may be been contaminated by the 
plastic explosives used.44 Despite the serious injuries to an upper-level army official and the fact 
that a LTTE suicide bomber gained access to the military headquarters, one of the central 
questions of the investigation became if the suicide attacker was pregnant or not. Clearly, 
authentic motherhood was viewed as a vital question. If she was not pregnant, her actions would 
at least have been viewed as less destructive. The idea that a pregnant woman would carry out a 
suicide attack was simply too much to handle—the investigation reflected the need to return to 
traditional notions of gender. A non-pregnant suicide attacker is easier to come to terms with 
than a pregnant one. Then, at least she isn’t using the sacred power of motherhood as a 
destructive force. 
 Another telling trend in the coverage is language about abortion. One timeline of the Sri 
Lankan conflict included this line: “April 2006 –Army Commander Major General Sarath 
Fonseka is badly hurt in an abortive suicide attack on Army HQ in Colombo.”45 Another said,  
The abortive attempt on Sri Lanka army [C]hief Lieutenant General Sarath Fonsenka by a 
suspected pregnant LTTE woman cadre inside the military headquarters in April 2006 in 
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a way can be termed as the beginning of the last war fought by the LTTE under 
Prabhakaran's command.46  
The infatuation with the women’s pregnancy led to the crass label of the attack as “abortive.” 
Abortion rhetoric is too broad to discuss here, but it is viewed as an act that goes against the 
grain of motherhood and tradition. The LTTE themselves discourage abortion for Tamil women; 
they view it as an affront to the nationalist cause. They encourage women to produce as many 
nationalist fighters as possible. 
As I tried to display above, much of the coverage took pains to explain that the suicide 
attacker was not, in fact, pregnant. Those that didn’t debated Anoja’s pregnancy status explicitly. 
The illusion of pregnancy was the defining feature of this suicide attacker, and the media, and Sri 
Lanka, was overwhelmingly aware of how motherhood was used to dupe the Sri Lankan 
security.  
 The mother warrior narrative is just that—a powerful narrative. Mother warriors as 
suicide attackers considered too dangerous, and often, repulsive. When the Sri Lanka All Party 
Women’s Congress believed that the attack was committed by a pregnant woman, they issued a 
statement denigrating the attack.47 Overall, this debate hurt the LTTE’s popularity.48 
Gunawardena summarizes, “the revulsion at the decision of using a ‘pregnant’ woman has had 
adverse effects on the LTTE, both from the international community as well as from within the 
Tamil community itself.”49 The narrative if effective only when it demonstrates the importance 
of motherhood without putting real mothers at risk.   
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CONCLUSION 
This image is truly remarkable. Traditional notions of mothers and notions about modern 
suicide attackers are opposite; one is peaceful and one is bent on violence. I have attempted to 
show that the “mother warrior” narrative is pervasive in Tamil culture and influences how LTTE 
female suicide attackers are represented. Larger narratives about nationalism and gender have 
produced the mother warrior narrative in an attempt to make female suicide attackers acceptable 
to a more traditional society. 
This shows the importance of narrative in understanding female suicide attackers. 
Depicting them as mothers of the nation and protectors of the Tamil people is popular. It boosted 
recruitment and LTTE popularity, as well as ideologically supporting the role of female suicide 
attackers in the nationalist conflict for pro-Tamil audiences. But when the narrative translates 
into material experiences, such as “real” mothers killing for the nation, objections arise. People 
are comfortable with the narrative, but not the logical implications of accepting such a narrative. 
As Bloom bluntly states, “The advent of women suicide bombers has thus transformed the 
revolutionary womb into an exploding one.”50 This transformation was not accepted by external 
audiences. 
The “mother warrior” narrative explains women’s violence for easy societal 
consumption, and thus, neutralizes its political power. The fact that the narrative does not disturb 
conception of traditional gender roles makes this clear, even if the female suicide attacker does. 
Of course, it would be a mistake to discount that the narrative has any potential for 
women. Gonsalves argues that the mother warrior narrative has encouraged media to take female 
suicide attackers seriously, and view then as “politicized beings.” She argues that “[w]ithin the 
comfort of associations with motherhood, various media reports do focus on agency…because 
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the starting point is the patriarchally sanctioned wife/mother role.”51 The comfort with the 
motherhood role allows a different examination of the female suicide attacker. 
 However, I would argue that the fact that the mother warrior narrative merely displaces 
the focus onto the mother role, instead of recognizing the female suicide attackers’ actions at 
face value. While she may be depicted as an agent, as Gonsalves says, her agency is certainly 
tempered with a disproportionate focus on her gender. 
While the mother warrior-turned suicide attacker was too dangerous, the rape victim-
turned suicide attacker was a narrative that took hold in popular media. Both depictions utilize 
the ideas of sacrifice and nationalism. Where the motherhood narrative has failed, the narrative 
about female suicide attackers as rape victims has succeeded. I examine these differences in the 
following conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As the group with the most female suicide attackers in the world and nestled in an 
extremely conservative society, the LTTE deployed specific rhetorical strategies to make the 
attackers’ choices, and thus the group’s more acceptable. Two of the narratives that they created, 
the mother warrior and the rape victim, had similar intentions but different outcomes.  
In Chapter One, I described the importance of suicide as a military method for the LTTE. 
It began as a defensive tactic to guard the secrets and integrity of the group but quickly became 
used for aggressive military means. I also outlined the historical events that led to the emergence 
of the LTTE suicide attacker, and the phenomenon of the female suicide attacker more 
specifically. Women have been integral to the success of the suicide attack. The power of gender 
stereotypes mean that they are more easily disguised, and thus, more military effective. They can 
reach the LTTE’s most desired targets, political and military officials, with an ease that the male 
suicide attacker cannot. 
Clearly, the LTTE has much at stake with how their members are presented. They benefit 
by reifying gender norms to keep female suicide attackers above suspicion, and thus, maintain 
their strategic edge. This has had mixed results. We know that both narratives had resonance, at 
least, with the Tamil community. Both were used to increase women’s involvement in the group. 
The mother warrior was used to assuage families who were concerned about their mothers and 
daughters joining the group, as well as to encourage men to join and perform as well as the 
mother warrior superwoman. Dhanu’s image, as an extension of the already resonant narrative 
and stigmas about rape, was an extremely effective recruitment tool, as female participation in 
the group skyrocketed during 1991 and 1992, and women were rumored to carry pictures of her 
with them to the battlefield. These narratives are powerful enough to inspire vast numbers of 
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women to sacrifice their lives. Only one of the narratives, however, seemed to be picked up by 
people outside of the Tamil community. 
 Chapter Two was a case study the “rape victim” narrative. The LTTE released a 
statement that Dhanu had been raped in an attempt to explain her motivations for the act. Given 
that rape is perceived as an ethnic crime in Sri Lanka’s civil war, it was a motif that resonated. 
The rape narrative surrounding Dhanu had multiple benefits for the LTTE. It aided in 
recruitment of young women who feared the same fate, further vilified the Sri Lankan 
government and Indian Peace Keeping Forces, and provided a rationalization for Dhanu’s 
actions. Rape stigmas are also compatible with suicide attacks—according to the narrative, 
women were to get revenge by targeting the enemies of the Tamil nation.  
In this case, the narrative seems to have taken hold. It can be found in multiple forms of 
Sri Lankan and Western media, and even US pop culture. The LTTE’s message survived 
basically intact. Much coverage of Dhanu places the question of her rape as a central question, 
especially when discussing her motivations. Coverage of her is much more forgiving than 
coverage of Fonseka’s attempted assassin, despite the fact that Dhanu was successful in her 
mission and Anoja was not! 
Chapter Three was a case study of this “mother warrior” narrative. The mother warrior 
narrative is consistent with the Tamil nationalist cause. She supported the nation as she would 
support her children. Mother warriors, with a baby in one arm and a rifle in the other, were the 
epitome of the nationalist supporter. This narrative was effective in some ways and ineffective in 
others. It created an image palatable to Tamil society. Traditional values were a cornerstone of 
the LTTE’s policy, and popularity. However, the strength of the motherhood role was too 
powerful to be paired with the female suicide attacker role. While the narrative was consistent 
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with much of their platform, it was not enough to ease the discomfort with mothers using 
violence, even if for the Tamil cause. The debate about Fonseka’s would-be assassin, Anoja, was 
almost entirely focused on her pregnancy status. Her role as a suicide attacker was inevitably 
going to be denigrated; however, the obsession with the truth about the pregnancy indicated that 
while the narrative may be a comfortable depiction, “real” mothers using extreme violence are 
too dangerous.  
Even though Dhanu was disguised as a pregnant woman, like the female suicide attacker 
in Chapter Three,1 the rape narrative was the one to take hold. This suggests that it is easier for 
people to understand the motivations of a victim than a protective mother. While we could say 
both were effective inside the group, only the rape victim narrative really told hold and was 
widely accepted outside the LTTE. 
From this study, I draw several conclusions. First, these examples reify the power of 
narrative. As Fisher, Ricoeur and White have already explained, narrative functions to explain 
what seems unexplainable and give coherency to seemingly random historical events. Female 
suicide attackers break with gender roles so significantly that narrative is necessary to explain 
this difference; for societies to comprehend this contradiction. In both cases, the reactions to 
extreme violence like suicide attacks are tied to the narrative that surrounds those attacks. The 
mother warrior narrative inspired a backlash, while the rape victim narrative inspired sympathy. 
Understanding these narratives has serious implications for how suicide bombers are 
apprehended in many societies. And these are narratives that aren’t likely to change in the short 
term either. In cases of women’s violence, narratives tend to repeat themselves. As Morrissey 
notes,  
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[T]raumatic events, such as murders committed by women, are never narrated only once. 
Indeed, the need to repetitively narrate such events is their defining feature as traumatic. 
The trauma resides in the structure of the experience of the event, yet condemning the 
traumatized society to repeat it over and over via the narrative representation.2 
The intense interest in female suicide attackers is likely to hold, as least in the short term. 
Fascination with female suicide attackers mean that their narratives will likely be repeated. 
 Second, the narratives surrounding these female suicide attackers suggest the importance 
of narrative in explaining violence. Violence is not intrinsically political, but the narratives that 
surround that violence unquestionably are. These narratives focused almost entirely on the 
motivations of the female suicide attackers; Dhanu’s alleged rape and Anoja’s alleged 
pregnancy. This emphasis on the motivations of the women, instead of their actions, signals that 
we desire explanations for violence, and probably more so with cases of extreme violence like 
suicide attacks. Narratives fulfill our need by explaining causation. Like a story, we can only 
come to grips with violence by having access to what causes events, and characters that can be 
understood in simple terms. In these cases, the “backstory” of each of the women, ultimately, 
became much more important than any actions that they chose. 
Third, these narratives tell us that the power of gender stereotypes is still overwhelming. 
While I reference the conservatism of Sri Lankan society, I suspect that many of these same 
themes would arise in many different contexts—in fact, we are already seeing similar themes 
arise in narratives about Russia’s Black Widows.3 The very nature of female suicide attackers 
seems to deny the truth of gender stereotypes. However, in this case, I found that the reaction to 
their violence is to bring these exceptional women back into the fold through narrative rather 
than to modify gender stereotypes.  
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Fourth, this study has also raised questions about the interactions between narrative and 
agency. These narratives about women, almost by definition, cannot be considered feminist. 
They were created in order to appease a conservative society, not challenge it. While I’ve already 
outlined the difficulties in asking and answering questions about women’s empowerment in this 
situation, narrative does at least suggest how certain representations of women control their 
memory more than their chosen actions. This is evidenced by the fact that both of the narratives 
studied were concerned with the status of the attacker, as a victim or pregnant, instead of her 
actions, destructive as they were. Some may argue that isn’t possible to have a positive narrative 
about female suicide attackers precisely because of their use of violence. However, I think it is 
possible to have a narrative that doesn’t foreclose all avenues for agency, even if they are 
deploying a type of agency that we wouldn’t necessarily approve of. While the scope of this 
paper prevents me from analyzing the narratives surrounding male suicide attackers, I imagine 
that analysis of an attacker without recourse to gender is one starting point for a new narrative. 
Dhanu and Anoja’s stories have demonstrated that women’s violence can be used for 
specific material and rhetorical purposes. The LTTE tried to benefit from carrying out the attacks 
as well as controlling the narratives that surrounded their female suicide attackers, with limited 
success. I hope to have explained not only the power of gender stereotypes, even with a modern 
phenomenon like female suicide attacks, but the power of narrative as a political tool to 
encourage particular interpretations of violence. Since these women cannot tell their own stories, 
we ought to be careful with the ones that we tell about them.
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